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Abstract
The democratization process of countries all over the world after mass uprisings differs greatly. Some
countries are confronted with extreme violence, while others remain peaceful. This thesis examines
whether the amount of violence during mass uprisings leads to a longer democratization process and less
inclusive elections in terms of voter base. It looks at the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe which
brought down the Communist bloc. The repercussions of the presence or lack of violence during the mass
uprisings on the behavior of the population in each country is visible until this very day – with Romania
and Bulgaria still struggling from subtle, but deep-rooted internal conflicts and discomfort with the
concept of democracy, and Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia’s significant progress in
the democratization process and gradual increase of substantially embracing democratic values.
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Chapter I: Introduction and Methodology
The terms ‘violence’ and ‘revolution’ are attached to one another in a lot of scholarly work in the field of
political science. “Violence is as inseparable from revolution and counterrevolution as these are from
each other,”1 writes Arno J. Mayer in his book “The Furies”. Also, David Bell’s book on “Resistance and
Revolution” uses the terms ‘revolution’ and ‘internal war’ (first introduced by Harry Eckstein)
interchangeably, defining them as the point in time when “resistance aimed at changing the entire system
has become highly organized, violent, and wide-spread in participation”2. However, Bell wrote his book
back in 1973 – before the wave of revolutions of 1989, the uprisings in Latin America at the end of the
20th century and early 21st century, and most recently, the numerous revolts and resistance movements
that swept the North-African and Arab region in 2011 and onwards. The nature of resistance has changed.
Timothy Garton Ash talks about “the birth of a new genre of revolution, qualitatively different from the
Jacobin-Bolshevik model of 17893 and 19174”5. As the means, degrees of violence, and outcomes of such
forms of resistance differ over time, and as the ‘power of the people’ took new forms, scholars have been
defining and redefining the terms that were associated with regime changes worldwide.
The terms ‘revolution’, ‘mass uprising’, and ‘regime change’ are often used interchangeably, despite the
differences between them. However, what all of them have in common is that they usually involve mass
mobilization against an authoritarian regime and that they may involve violence. In a speech in Denmark
in 1932, Leon Trotsky defined ‘revolution’ as “a change of the social order. It transfers the power from
the hands of a class which has exhausted itself into those of another class, which is in the ascendant.”6 In
his book “Study of Revolution”, Peter Calvert characterizes a revolution as “a process in which the
political direction of a state becomes discredited in the eyes of the population, a change of government at
a definite point in time by use or threat of force, [and] the program of change in political or social
1

(Mayer 2000)
(Bell 1973)
3
In reference to the French Revolution.
4
In reference to the Russian Revolution.
5
(Garton Ash 2009)
6
(Trotsky 1932)
2
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institutions induced by the revolutionary event”7. On the other hand, ‘uprising’ is considered “an act of
opposition, sometimes using violence, by many people in one area of a country against those who are in
power”8. The addition of the ‘mass’ to ‘uprising’ does not change its meaning, but rather amplifies the
size of the people participating in the uprising. The literature suggests that a revolution can only be named
as such when a complete shift in the system is witnessed after it occurs, while a tangible outcome is a
feature less focused on when talking about an uprising. Most mass uprisings have been referred to as
revolutions in not only the mass media, but also in scholarly work across the discipline; however, this
label is usually misplaced. One of the most recent examples is the so-called Arab Spring. Shortly after the
first protests broke out across various countries in the Middle East, people had already referred to them as
revolutions, before any viable, tangible change had happened. Goldstone defines revolution as “an effort
to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society,
accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine
existing authorities”9. Hence, one could conclude that mass uprisings are a part of the revolutionary
process, rather than a different form of rejecting the regime in power.
The literature has also often resorted to the simple assumption that regime change automatically means a
shift from authoritarianism to democracy10. But this assumption is far from what the word actually
implies. ‘Regime change’ is “the replacement of one administration or government by another, especially
by means of military force”11. Hence, it does not necessarily guarantee a shift to democracy and is almost
limited to the presence of military force as a main catalyst for change.
For this thesis, anti-authoritarian mass uprisings will be examined – namely acts of opposition and
mobilization by many people in a country against an authoritarian regime. They do not necessarily ensure

7

(Calvert 1979)
(Cambridge Dictionaries n.d.)
9
(J. A. Goldstone 2001, J. Goldstone 1998, Goodwin 2001)
10
(Gasioriwski 1996)
11
(Oxford Dictionaries n.d.)
8
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a change in social order, as Trotsky’s definition of revolution implies, and do not necessarily include
military force.
Bringing down authoritarian regimes and paving way for democracy to unfold through mass uprisings has
been becoming more frequent – however, each country had to pay its own price. Some countries were
confronted with extreme violence, while others remained peaceful. The question is: how does the violence
induced – or the lack of it – during mass uprisings affect the democratization process after an
authoritarian regime has been toppled? The aim is not necessarily to prove causation, but rather to
examine the correlation between the variables at hand.
The research question of this thesis is: How does the degree of violence in anti-authoritarian mass
uprisings affect the duration of the following democratization process and the political participation of
actors? Of course, not all mass uprisings lead to democracy; hence, this question focuses on those
occurrences that actually result in a democratization process.
The hypothesis at hand is that the more violence occurs during mass uprisings, the slower the
democratization process and the lower the participation of all actors in the democratic processes that
follow. Here, the independent variable is the “degree of violence”, while the dependent variables are “the
duration of the democratization processes” and “the inclusive political participation of various actors”.
Methodology
The methodology used to examine the hypothesis will be purely comparative, focusing on qualitative and
Medium N case-studies of violent and nonviolent mass uprisings.
All cases used are countries that witnessed mass uprisings against authoritarian regimes and that became
democratic later on. The conceptual and operational definition of the key variables below will explain
how each of them will be measured:
1. Violence:

6

Oxford Dictionaries defines ‘violence’ from a perspective of law, stating that it is “the unlawful exercise
of physical force or intimidation by the exhibition of such force”12. For this thesis, I will rely on Gene
Sharp’s operational definition, who explains that violence is the injury or death of persons – thus
excluding property damage, for instance, as a form of violence, unless it leads to human casualties13.
In order to be classified as either violent or nonviolent, case-studies were selected based on either the
absolute and total lack of casualties, or the presence of a considerable amount of casualties. Whereas this
may seem like a radical approach, it helps with establishing a clear cut between violent and nonviolent
anti-authoritarian mass uprisings, and hence, adds credibility and foundation to the outcome and
conclusion of the thesis.
The number of casualties is calculated from both sides – the number of killed people on the side of the
opposed regime and the ones on the side of the demonstrators and opposition. The more casualties, the
higher the level of violence.
Additionally, this thesis will not distinguish between violence triggered by either spontaneous causes, the
breakdown of the law enforcement process, or violence that had been deliberately planned by the
government or civilians14.
2. Anti-authoritarian Mass Uprisings:
For this thesis, the traditional definition of ‘uprising’ will be used, which is “an act of opposition,
sometimes using violence, by many people in one area of a country against those who are in power”15.
In order to be classified as an anti-authoritarian mass uprising, case-studies that were selected for this
thesis have to fulfill the following criteria:


Mass mobilization of civilians against an authoritarian regime

12

(Violence - Definition of Violence in English from the Oxford Dictionaries n.d.)
(Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action 1973)
14
(Leiden and Schmitt 1968)
15
(Cambridge Dictionaries n.d.)
13
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Going through a mode of transition



Total change of political regime and type of governance, and not just a change of
government, aiming at a democratic regime

3. Duration of Democratization Process:
Before defining ‘democratization’, it is necessary to agree on a definition of democracy. For the purpose
of this thesis, the minimalist definition of the term will be used, based on Robert Dahl’s conditions for
democracy, in addition to Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl’s definition in “What Democracy is…
and is not”. Democracy is “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions
in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected
representatives”16. Adding to that, Dahl specified seven conditions that need to be present in order for
democracy to exist: the control of elected officials over government decisions, free and fair elections,
suffrage for all adults, the right to run for elective offices, freedom of expression, freedom of information,
and the right to form parties, interest groups, and independent associations17.
‘Democratization’ is the process of moving away from military rule, one-party domination, or
personalized dictatorship to democracy18. This usually occurs through mass mobilization and resistance.
Political scientists have so far not come to a unanimous conclusion that specifies when the process of
democratization can be rendered complete or successful. Here it is important to disaggregate the
democratization concept into two aspects: transition (an interval between political regimes, during which
procedures and exact strategies are still undefined), and consolidation (a point in time when democracy
has become the norm, and is thus sustainable)19.

16

(Schmitter and Karl 1991)
Ibid.
18
(Carter 2012)
19
(Munck, Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratization 1996)
17
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The duration of the democratization process is the time calculated from the beginning of the antiauthoritarian mass uprising, up until the country is considered a full democracy. The longer the
duration, the slower the process.
4. Level of Participation:
Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie define political participation as “behavior designed to affect the choice
of governmental personnel and/or policies”20, which means that this behavior needs to take place within
the government guidelines and follow processes set up and defined by the regime in place. Although they
do not include passive forms of political participation, civil disobedience, or even behavior that occurs
beyond the sphere of government21, this conceptual definition directly serves the needed operational
definition of the term for this hypothesis. Since I am looking at the political participation of different
actors within a structure during the democratization process, it is not necessary to resort and consider
forms of political participation that defy the official processes, like elections and party creation.
This thesis will measure two aspects of political participation in the democratization process: the voter
turnout and the inclusiveness of the elections after mass uprisings.
Voter turnout will determine whether people were willing to participate in the elections in the first place,
and thus, be part of the new political system. The turnout will be looked at in terms of the participation of
all eligible voters, not just the actual number of voters. This will also show whether the acts of violence
during and after the mass uprising intimidated voters and persuaded them to stay at home instead of
risking their wellbeing by casting a ballot.
Election inclusiveness will be measured by how many movements gained seats in the first elected
parliament after the uprising to deduce the political orientation of the voters and whether they were
intimidated by acts of violence to change their vote choice or not.

20
21

(Verba and Nie 1972)
(Conge 1988)
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The higher the percentage of voters, the more political participation by the actors. The more
diverse and fragmented the outcome of the election, the higher the inclusiveness and participation
of actors from various political ideologies and factions without fear for the voters’ wellbeing or –
more dramatically – life.
For instance, if a parliamentary election leads to the ruling party’s absolute majority in the house, this is
considered an indication proving that the voter base was not diversified and that a certain segment of
society with specific political ideologies had participated heavily, while the others had not. If the
parliament is fragmented with no absolute majority and includes actors from different political parties,
this is considered an indication proving that the voter base was diversified and that actors with various
political ideologies participated, making the parliament more representative of the country it stands for.
Measurement of variables
The amount of violence, i.e. number of casualties, will be gathered by different news outlets and journals,
depending on the case at hand. If several, contradicting numbers appear, the geometrical mean will be
used to calculate the mean22.
To evaluate the variables concerned with democratization and voter turnout, this research will rely on the
Democracy Index by The Economist Intelligence Unit, the Polity IV Project, and the archives of election
outcomes of the different countries.
It is important to note that this thesis will not abide by the structural functionalism approach, formerly
introduced by Thelda Skocpol, which does not draw the line between social and political revolutions23.
This thesis will look only at the shift of political forms of governance and their implications, the amount
of violence they inflict, and how the duration of the democratization process and the political participation
are affected.
22

When statistics given are far apart in numerical value, the geometrical mean becomes the more correct tool to
calculate the mean, than the normal calculation of an average. The calculation consists of the square root of the
multiplication of both numbers.
23
(Skocpol 1979)
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The cases selected for this thesis will be the 1989 anti-authoritarian mass uprisings that brought down the
Communist bloc in Eastern Europe – namely Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.
As post-war nations and countries that were highly affected by the rebuilding and re-establishment of
Europe after World War II, these cases were chosen based on their proximity to each other
geographically, historically, and / or in the tools they used in bringing down the Communist bloc. The
cases mentioned above include countries that are similar in terms of social constructs and economic
conditions, and have actually moved on to be democracies down the line. The main difference between
them lies in the amount of violence that was witnessed during the uprisings – while some of them passed
peacefully and without casualties, others suffered tremendously. East Germany is not included, given that
its political structure was different, as it was divided into two blocs under different mandates right after
the war ended. While West Germany was already democratized by the time of the uprising in 1989, which
resulted in unification and a six-month period of democratization, the Eastern bloc was under Communist
rule. It would not be solid to compare the case to the other countries, although it would have greatly
supported the hypothesis, as Germany’s anti-authoritarian mass uprising was peaceful, resulted in no
casualties, and has been considered democratic ever since.
These cases will be examined according to the number of casualties that occurred during and following
the mass uprisings. The dependent variable of the democratization process will be evaluated according to
Polity IV Project from the year of the uprising up until the latest available data. Since most of the
statistics available in the Polity IV Project end around 2007, the thesis will also take the rankings and
classification of the countries in the Democracy Index 201524 into consideration, in order to understand
where these countries stand today. The voter turnout of the populations will be measured from right
before the uprisings in 1989 – if applicable – up until the latest available election data, while the
inclusiveness in elections will be examined according to the composition of the first parliaments elected
after the uprisings, namely between 1989 and 1991. While some cases will be qualitatively and

24

Looking at whether they are full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, or authoritarian regimes.
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descriptively presented, others will be looked at from a quantitative manner. The qualitative section will
help in testing the causality, and highlighting and explaining the relationship between violence, the
political development of the country and the political behavior of the people – if one exists –, while the
Medium-N chapter will compile the statistics of the different cases to either prove or disprove the
hypothesis.
For the qualitative section, this thesis will compare the mass uprising in Poland to the one in Romania
(both in 1989). Both countries brought down the communist regime around 1989, and had been under
similar rule for quite some time before that. Both countries also started their resistance towards the
Communist bloc early on, with one major difference: Poland witnessed a peaceful mass uprising and is
considered one of the safest countries in Europe25 today, while Romania went through a transition of
increasing violence, which can still be seen in the country’s crime rate today. Nowadays, Romania suffers
from corruption, while Poland is considered a role model in fighting corruption and managing funds26.
One of Romania’s latest civil unrests was recorded in 2015, when a fire in a night club killed 32 people
and resulted in protests calling on the prime minister to resign. During these protests, symbols that were
used in the 1989 anti-authoritarian mass uprising against former president Nicolae Ceauşescu were raised
one more time, nearly 25 years after they had been first used27. Another wave of protests – considered
“the largest protests Romania has seen since the fall of communism 27 years ago”28 – gripped the country
in February 2017, when hundreds of thousands took to the streets to protest an emergency decree by the
government which decriminalized corruption. Acts of violence were witnessed as 150,000 people
protested in Bucharest and firecrackers and bottles were thrown at the police, after which five were taken
to the hospital29. On the other hand, Poland has barely witnessed major unrest ever since the fall of the
Communist bloc in 1989, partly because it enjoys a very strong, organized labor movement, as opposed to
Romania. Poland is the home of the bloc’s first independent labor trade union Solidarity, whose
25

(Bureau of Diplomatic Security - Overseas Security Advisory Council 2016)
(Institute of Local Development 2012)
27
(Agence France-Presse 2015)
28
(Moldovan 2017)
29
Ibid.
26
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cofounder and head Lech Walesa was the country’s president for the first few years after the Soviet Union
crumbled. In December 2016, the first signs of civil unrest re-emerged after the government considered
limiting media access to the parliament, although freedom of the press was seemingly unlimited ever
since 1989 – a considered triumph to democracy for many Polish citizens30. Poland is also ranked higher
than Romania in the Economist’s Democracy Index. Romania on the other hand is still considered a
flawed democracy until 201531; its presidential elections had an average voter turnout of about 62%32,
while its parliamentary elections stood at 59.5%33. The number of casualties that occurred during the antiauthoritarian mass uprising of 1989 in Romania is disputed, ranging between 1,000 and 1,200, while
initial claims stood at 60,00034. Fact is, political violence had caused deaths in 1989 and 1990 – but it did
not stop there. According to John Gledhill and others, “throughout the 1990s, Romania's transition from
authoritarianism was witness to repeated instances of intense collective violence”35. As violence led to
frustration which led to more violence – as Freud had stated –, a smooth democratic process is not
possible, especially when considering that Romania still falls under the category of “flawed
democracies”. Digging deeper into the cases will provide a larger outlook on how violence and political
development and behavior could be connected.
The Medium-N section will compile the data of the different cases, and examine the accuracy of the
hypothesis. In other words, it will test in how many violent cases the duration of the democratization
process prolonged and the inclusiveness of political participation was low, and vice versa.
The thesis is divided into six chapters, starting with the introduction and the methodology. Chapter II is
dedicated to an extensive literature review focusing on the use of violence – or the lack of it – during
mass uprisings, the differentiation between nonviolent phenomena, the implications of using violence
30

(Day 2016)
(The Economist 2015)
32
(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance n.d.) Average of voter turnout in the presidential
elections of 1996, 2000, 2004, 2009 and 2014.
33
(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance n.d.) Average of voter turnout in the parliamentary
elections of 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012.
34
(Roper 2000)
35
(Gledhill, States of Contention: State-Led Political Violence in Post-Socialist Romania 2005)
31
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during mass uprisings on the duration of the democratization process, voter turnout, and inclusiveness in
democratic processes, and lastly, the conceptual framework and the relationship between the variables of
the hypothesis. The third chapter qualitatively examines the cases of Poland and Romania with regards to
the hypothesis, while the fourth chapter examines the Medium N cases, namely Hungary, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Chapter V highlights the main findings of the thesis, while chapter VI
brings the thesis to conclusion by looking at recommendations and limitations of the research. The thesis
is followed by a bibliography and appendices.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
This thesis is heavily connected to contentious politics, as first introduced by Charles Tilly, who defined
the term as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which
governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties”36. Transitions from
authoritarian regimes are widely covered in the field of not only political science, but humanities as a
whole, including psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy etc. Gerardo L. Munck and Carol
Skalnik Leff highlight the importance of examining these transitions by stating: “the very process of
transition from authoritarian rule, independently of the conditions that generated it, helps determine not
only the prospects of democratic consolidation but also the success of the transition to democracy in the
first place”37. A transition is defined as the interval between dissolving the authoritarian regime and the
establishment of a new one38. Scholars have largely agreed on four modes of transition from authoritarian
to democratic rule, two of which are smooth, and two of which are violent and rapid. The violent, rapid
modes include transition through collapse, in which opposition groups collectively bring down the
incumbent regime but usually get divided after the fall, and transition through foreign intervention, in
which foreign powers interfere to help the opposition to tackle the old regime and rebuild the governance
process of the country again39. The smooth modes of transition include transition through cooperation, in
which opposition forces lead the shift in power through mass support, and transition through conversion,
in which the incumbents lead the shift by reforming and redefining electoral rules40.
In the literature on nonviolence, scholars and activists are usually divided into two conceptual schools that
could be considered complementary: the principled nonviolence approach and the pragmatic nonviolence
approach. The principled nonviolence approach – mainly embodied in Mahatma Gandhi – advocates
nonviolence based on religious, moral or philosophical grounds, condemning any other form of
36

(Tilly, The Contentious French 1986)
(Munck and Leff, Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparitive
Perspective 1997)
38
(Stradiotto and Guo 2010)
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
37
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resistance41. The success of the nonviolent campaign is not only measured by its outcome, but also by its
journey, and is considered a way of conflict resolution that emerges from the internal, human
development. The pragmatic approach is best embodied by Gene Sharp, who looks at strategies and
techniques of nonviolent resistance and their effectiveness42, as best laid out in his conceptual framework
of liberation, which is discussed further below. While the first school is based on the scholar’s or
activist’s conviction of doing the ‘right’ thing by avoiding the use of violence, the second school is made
up of those who believe in the strategic value of nonviolence in a conflict as opposed to violence, based
on statistics of previous uprisings.
In 1991, Adam Roberts wrote that Eastern European uprisings in 1989 have shown that “nonviolent
methods have a greater importance than has been allowed for in many philosophies”43. However, they
also showed that peaceful civil resistance is not necessarily the complete opposite of violence, let alone a
substitute for it, as violence may “contribute to the conditions in which civil resistance can take place,”
Roberts explains44. While the anti-authoritarian mass uprisings in Germany, Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia all passed rather peacefully, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s fates were different, as they had
fallen victim to the use of violence before and/or during the uprising. Some scholars attribute the presence
or absence of violence to the strength of the civil society and labor movements45, as well as the economic
conditions, namely whether a country is a rentier or tax state46. This point will be further examined
through the case studies in the coming section.
Regarding the use of violence or nonviolence during mass uprisings, several authors tend to “equate
revolution and the excessive use of violence”47. Samuel Huntington, for instance, interchangeably used
the terms ‘revolution’ and ‘violence’ in some of his publications. He stated that revolution, like “other

41

(Dudouet 2011)
Ibid.
43
(Roberts, Civil Resistance in the East European and Soviet Revolutions 1991)
44
Ibid.
45
(Della Porta 2014)
46
(Costello 2016)
47
(Zimmermann 1983)
42
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forms of violence and instability, […] is most likely to occur in societies which have experienced some
social and economic development [but] where the processes of political modernization and development
have lagged behind the processes of social and economic change”48. However, the more one delves into
modern literature, it becomes evident that “it is not the use of violence which is characteristic of
revolutions as opposed to other forms of conflict, but rather the consequences revolutionary activities
have for the particular social infrastructure”49.
Violence – in general – can be an instrument of political power, and falls into three categories: violence
triggered by spontaneous causes, by the breakdown of the law enforcement process, or by being
deliberately planned by the government or civilians50. As anti-authoritarian mass uprisings often brings
upon social change, H. L. Nieburg states in his paper on “The threat of violence and social change” that
“no system can hope to survive unless it can live with and adjust itself to the multitudinous threats of
violence which are the basis of social change”51. Frustration and disappointment can quickly trigger
violent acts by people who are emotionally involved in a cause, and the attitude is facilitated by the
existence or emergence of ingredients of violent action52.
The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions states that “political revolutions need not include violence, but
the more fundamental the political and social change advocated by the forces of revolution, the greater the
likelihood that violence will play a role in the revolutionary struggle and the larger the role will be.”53
In general, it is believed that countries with a large disparity in power witness violent transitions, whereas
in countries “where opposition groups and incumbents are relatively equal in power, […] transition tends
to be characterized by bargaining and negotiation”54; hence, more peacefully. Kurt Schock claims that

48

(Huntington 1968)
(Zimmermann 1983)
50
(Leiden and Schmitt 1968)
51
(Nieburg 1962)
52
(Leiden and Schmitt 1968)
53
(J. Goldstone 1998)
54
(Stradiotto and Guo 2010)
49
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“empirically, political contention is transgressive and there are rarely cases of purely nonviolent struggle,
especially in non-democratic contexts”55. However, he is mistaken, as the following context proves.
One of the most prominent studies on nonviolent resistance is Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan’s
“Why Civil Resistance Works – The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict”, which looks at 323 cases
between 1900 and 2006, in which masses in different countries called for regime change in a peaceful
manner. They concluded that nonviolent resistance campaigns were twice as successful as violent
uprisings in achieving their goals and emerge with democratic institutions56, tracing this back to the
increased chances of loyalty shifts by security forces in nonviolent campaigns. The authors also explain
that the democracies brought to life by nonviolent resistance are more sustainable and peaceful, and 15%
less likely to relapse into civil war57, than those that were born by bloodshed.
Donatella Della Porta asserts that the occurrence of violence in the 1989 anti-authoritarian mass uprisings
in Europe mainly depended on the capacity of a regime to repress through controlling coercive forces, and
the power and strength of civil society over ensuring the peacefulness of protests58. Looking at Europe
and the MENA-region, the scholar highlights that the behavior of the military in a given country can
influence the emergence of violence during mass uprisings and affect the way events unfold. Variables to
consider here are possible splits within the military hierarchy, as well as foreign military intervention.
Leiden and Schmitt also look at the factors that determine the degree of violence during anti-authoritarian
mass uprisings specifically. They state that it is not only determined by its participants, but rather by the
grain of violence that already exists in them. The authors explain: “Mobs do not deliberate, and the
momentary, seemingly trivial, decisions made by any number of individuals in a milieu of chaos can
produce the violence and bloodshed that all might otherwise abhor. […] where there already exist

55

(Schock 2003)
(Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works 2011)
57
(Chenoweth, The Success of Nonviolent Resistance 2013)
58
(Della Porta 2014)
56
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ingrained habits of violence, the more readily will the revolutionary power struggle splash over into
incalculable, ungovernable, and destructive bursts of energy.”59
As an anti-authoritarian mass uprising does not necessarily lead to violence, another question comes to
mind which had captured the attention of many authors and scholars: Does violence lead to antiauthoritarian mass uprisings? Leiden and Schmitt believe that the presence of violence in a community or
society does not make an anti-authoritarian mass uprising more likely; however, if an anti-authoritarian
mass uprising happens, it will be accompanied by generous amounts of violence60.
The success of an uprising relies on three main factors: the effectiveness of the state, the organizational
abilities and experiences of the opposition, and – most importantly for this research – the extent of elite
power on the coercive apparatus61. Although the extent of power in the latter point is not the main focus
of this research, it does shed light on the role of violence and the type of violence that might emerge
during uprisings. It is not only the elite’s power over the coercive apparatus that makes all the difference,
but the methods used by the coercive apparatus in reaction to the elite’s orders. If the elite order the police
or the army or the guerillas – or any other coercive apparatus in any given context – to exercise violence
against the masses, will these fractions obey the orders or will they refrain? If the apparatus resorts to
violence, to which extents is it willing to go? Will it blindly obey and – for the lack of a better expression
– go the whole nine yards in violently eliminating the opposition, whether in its constitutional or informal
form, or will it at any point take a step back? These questions lead to even further variables that are
relevant to the context, most importantly the reaction of those coerced against.
But violence is not necessarily initiated from above. Della Porta explains that the accessibility of social
movements to political opportunities – for instance political institutions and strategies – could determine
how those movements act in times of protest against the regime. Jeff Goodwin mainly argues that violent
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mass uprisings are a reaction to political oppression and violence from above62 – a generalization that is
not necessarily deemed feasible, specifically when talking about violence. However, he states that “when
normal channels of access to the political system are blocked, violence might be perceived as necessary,
as there is no other way out”63. Goldstone echoes the argument by stating that revolutionary forces may
use assassinations, kidnapping, or terrorist attacks to intimidate the regime and gain supporters64.
However, he adds that “revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces alike can use torture to sow terror
and demoralization and to obtain information”65.
One of the early contenders of the relationship between revolution and force or violence was Karl Marx,
followed by Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin. In Marx’ Amsterdam speech of 1872, he states that
while some countries have institutions and systems that allow workers to gain their rights peacefully,
other countries require force in order to lever revolutions and establish labor-reign66. However, Marx and
Engels were considered somehow moderate when it came to the use of violence, as stated by Marx in an
interview in 1871: “We must make clear to the governments: we know that you are the armed power that
is directed against the proletariat; we will proceed against you by peaceful means where that is possible
and with arms when it is necessary.”67 Lenin, on the other hand, started out as an opponent to the use of
violence, and progressively developed into a firm, extreme supporter of the application of violence and
even went as far as allowing terrorist activities of the masses “intended to arouse panic and fear amongst
specific target groups”68. He stated: “Individual terroristic acts are impractical as a means of political
strife. It is only a mass movement that can be considered to be a real political struggle. Individual
terroristic acts can, and must be, helpful only when they are directly linked with the mass movement.”69
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However violent or not an action is considered, scholars should not drift away from the fact that even
unarmed resistance is a mean of coercion, as it threatens social, economic, political or physical sanctions
in case its demands are not met70. Many scholars deal with nonviolence as a method that holds high moral
grounds, while in the end, it mainly just differs from violent resistance in the use of actual physical
coercion. The question that arises here would be how democratic nonviolence is, given that is in fact a
method of coercion, but this is a topic for another paper.
On a different note, nonviolent action sometimes leads to violent action, and vice versa71. History has
shown that violent struggles sometimes shift to nonviolent methods, when the participants realize that
their turn to aggression is not bearing much fruit. One example would be the struggle of Latvia against the
Soviet Union72. In opposition to the Soviet occupation after World War II, the Latvians realized how their
culture and language were repressed by the invaders, and launched guerilla tactics to fight the oppressors.
It is estimated that around 40,000 Latvians73 were involved in guerilla warfare at the time, as part of the
Baltic liberation movement of Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Latvia against the Soviet Union. In 1945
and 1946 alone, over 10,000 people were killed, arrested or amnestied due to guerillas in Latvia74.
Starting 1952, the violence seemed to be ineffective, and nonviolent methods started to emerge in order to
strive for Latvian independence. Such methods included boycotting communist organizations and Soviet
elections, refusing to speak Russian, defending the Latvian culture in communist institutions, and
celebrating Latvian national days, as well as organizing an independence campaign. Throughout the
years, marches and peaceful protests were met with arrests and media slander. Nevertheless, proindependence marches had reached 500,000 participants on a regular basis by 1989, and several anticommunist movements emerged, harboring ties with similar groups in Estonia and Lithuania. Latvia
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gained its independence in 1991 without suffering casualties after 195275. The case of Latvia highlights
the possibility of turning violent uprisings into nonviolent ones.
Another example for uprisings that toppled dictatorships by resorting to nonviolence after violent action is
Iran, as Schock explains76. Iran’s Shah was supported by SAVAK, an internal ruthless security apparatus,
which was faced by two guerilla underground movements called Fedayeen and Mujahhadin77. However,
those guerilla movements and their tactics did not cause the Shah to fall. It was the rise of peaceful
citizens who took the streets in protest, and organized boycotts and civil disobedience which brought
about a revolutionary outcome, defined as “the transfer of state power from those who held it before the
start of multiple sovereignty to a new ruling coalition”78. Despite the peacefulness of the uprising, the
following period was marked with heightened violence and coercion under the rule of Islamist Ayatollah
Khomeini, which supports the theory of how nonviolent uprisings bringing down dictatorships do not
necessarily lead to democratic or peaceful regimes.
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Differentiation between nonviolent phenomena
When talking about collective political action in contentious politics, there are three main forms of
resistance: nonviolent protest (verbal opposition, demonstrations etc.), riots (sabotage, attempts to gain
power) and rebellion (political banditry)79.
Revolutionary phenomena arise due to a number of causes, according to the literature. It can start with
changes in international relations and the dependency on external forces for internal development, shifts
in client-patron networks, changes in regime vulnerability, and the presence or emergence of a systemic
crisis, be it political, economic, or symbolic80.
When looking at nonviolent action, the literature sets some characteristics that define the nature of such
action in order to refute misconceptions. Kurt Schock states that nonviolent action is non-institutional,
and should not be equated to inaction, submissiveness, avoidance of conflict or passive resistance81. In
order to be considered nonviolent actions, such movements need to involve risk and consist of contextspecific “nonviolent coercion in contentious interaction between opposing groups”82. It could be legal or
illegal and does not necessarily use institutionalized approaches, while suffering is also not essentially
one of its main components83. Shephard states that nonviolent resistance requires patience, but is not
necessarily deemed slower than other methods aiming to bring about the desired change84.
While revolutions without violence are unusual, they tend to occur in “societies that have high levels of
social and cultural cohesion and accepted political mechanisms for implementing and accommodating
change”85. Same goes for revolutions where the threat of violence exists, but is not realized86, according
to Goldstone.
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Most studies on nonviolent anti-authoritarian mass uprisings focus on the tools used during the examined
uprisings and their effectiveness in causing the change that is called for. Such tools are boycotts, refusal
to cooperate, strikes etc. This can happen either through withdrawal of regime support (also called
Gandhian Model), or through enforcing fair elections by active political participation (also labelled as
Electoral Model)87. In his volume on “The Politics of Nonviolent Action”, Gene Sharp specifies four
mechanisms of change that contribute to the success of nonviolent resistance of any form: Conversion - in
which the opposed change their outlook and adopt the point of view of the nonviolent activists;
accommodation - in which activists are granted the change they wanted without the utter conviction of
those opposed; nonviolent coercion - where the opposed loses control over his tool of power through
nonviolent means by the masses, and thus, change is achieved; and disintegration – where the opposed
regime falls to pieces88.
Of course, there is no clear-cut, universal methodology to resist political systems and safely, peacefully
turn them into sustainable, consolidated democracies. In his book “From Dictatorship to Democracy: A
Conceptual Framework for Liberation”, Sharp explains that even though his manual of how to topple
dictatorships was based on a number of cases and countries, each country needs to “examine the validity
of this analysis for their situations and the extent to which its major recommendations are, or can be made
to be, applicable for their liberation struggles”89. While he asserts that fighting dictators will always bring
casualties, but that his analysis should urge the leaders of resistance movements to aim for strategies that
enhance their effective power, and decreasing the number of casualties90. His suggestion to countries that
are aiming to bring down dictatorships in a nonviolent manner is to strengthen the oppressed population
and its social groups and institutions, establish an internal resistance force, and have a strategic plan.
Sharp has a very pacifist approach to the matter, repeatedly emphasizing that the nonviolent behavior

87

(Nepstad 2011)
(Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action 1973)
89
(Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation 2002)
90
Ibid.
88

24

must emerge from within the revolutionary force, rather than being imposed on it from external factors or
entities.
Sharp explains that peaceful political defiance needs to consist of seven characteristics, in order to be
successful, including leading dictators to err in judgement and action, sever the dictatorship’s sources of
power, finding the regime’s Achilles’ heel91, effectively mobilizing the population, not accepting the
means of fighting that the dictatorial regime enforces, make it hard for the regime to combat, and
distributing effective power92. While violent confrontations use physical weapons, nonviolent struggles
use psychological, economic, social and political weapons, which crystalize in about 200 methods,
including “protests, strikes, noncooperation, boycotts, disaffection, and people power”93. These methods
fall under three umbrellas: protest and persuasion (symbolic marches, parades etc.), noncooperation
(social, economic, or political), and intervention (such as nonviolent occupation and parallel
governments)94. Sharp explains: “The use of a considerable number of these methods – carefully chosen,
applied persistently and on a large scale, wielded in the context of a wise strategy and appropriate tactics,
by trained civilians – is likely to cause any illegitimate regime severe problems. This applies to all
dictatorships.”95
However, the most challenging part of nonviolent action lies in its sustainability and continuity. Violence
can erupt at any second, as soon as one member of the nonviolent movement is aggravated, which then in
turn can lead to mass violence in larger crowds, or when the power dynamics shift, either internally or
externally. In Kosovo in the early 1980s, for instance, nonviolent tactics in the fight for independence
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seemed useless, leading to the creation and increasing power of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which in
turn led to the displacement of thousands, mainly Serbians96.
But violence does not necessarily have to emerge from within the movement. The reaction of the state and
its security apparatus – be it the police or military or other entities that support and protect the incumbent
– could also bring about violence. Della Porta stresses this point by stating that “initial eruptions of
peaceful protest [in the MENA region in 2011 and Eastern Europe in 1989] were unsuccessful in bringing
about democratization, instead developing into either coups d’état or armed conflict”97. She adds that
brutal reactions from the regime cause escalation and radicalization98, feeding into Freud’s theory that
violence breeds violence.
It is evident that most of the literature stems from the principled nonviolence school, painting a rosy
picture of nonviolent action and glorifying, sometimes even overestimating, its effectiveness and
efficiency. But one must understand that several nonviolent uprisings were crushed and completely
eradicated by authoritarian regimes, such as Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Tiananmen
Square protests in China etc., while others only partly succeeded, such as the Palestinian first intifada and
the US civil rights movement99.
Possible implications of using violence during mass uprisings on the duration of the
democratization process
After looking at how the literature dealt with violence and nonviolence in mass uprisings, and how
nonviolent phenomena differ from one another and how they develop, it is time to look at how violence
actually affects the duration of the following democratization process.
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Hannah Arendt said it in 1969: “The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most
probable change is to a more violent world.”100 Universally, violence is not considered a pillar of
democracy.
When talking about Albania, Louisa Chiodi states that “right up until its final days, the regime’s
apparatus of repression had been very successful in preventing the emergence of open criticism, and not
even the few people who, under the severe control of the secret services, could travel abroad did dare to
openly challenge even the language of the system”101.
Della Porta explains that weak civil societies are usually a characteristic of “violent uprisings and
troubled democratizations”102, adding that protests in general are unlikely to ease the democratization
process.
Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud talks about the “displacement of aggression”, which results in a foundation
underlying the frustration-aggression theory103. Aggression is a consequence of frustration, just as
frustration breeds aggression. “The ending of political violence often raises the level of face-to-face street
violence”104, according to John Darby in his book “The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes”.
Violence can reoccur either as a result of militant group fragmentation, or in the form of either street
violence or a rising crime rate105. However, this does not mean that violence is surely to reoccur after
democracy has been consolidated – or as Dankwart Rustow stated: “The factors that keep a democracy
stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence”106. After violence hits a country, it is important
to reconcile among different parties and societal segments. In the early stages of conflict, there is a higher
chance of success for mediators to settle between different political actors, because “attitudes and
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perceptions have not hardened and parties are still willing to talk to each other,”107 according to Crocker,
Hampson and Aall. If early mediation does not take place, external states may be needed in order to “fix”
the situation, because they may be able to offer “the requisite political will and muscle required to bring
parties to the table and to end violence”108.
For violent resistance, Sharp uses the example of guerilla warfare and its possible effect on the
democratization process that would follow a violent conflict or uprising. He states that “guerilla struggles
often have significant long-term negative structural consequences”109, even if the guerilla struggle
succeeds. The emerging regime is more likely to be more dictatorial than its predecessor, given “the
centralizing impact of the expanded military forces and the weakening or destruction of the society’s
independent groups and institutions during the struggle – bodies that are vital in establishing and
maintaining a democratic society”110. Sharp continues with looking at coup d’états, which usually end
with a maldistribution of power, allowing third parties, who might not be open to democratic reforms, to
take control. The scholar’s underlying notion, which he does not explicitly address but which can be
deduced from his works, is the uncertainty that follows violent eras. His main chain of thoughts is based
on the “what if”-question, subtly implying that peaceful resistance is more organized and guaranteed to
end in democratic consolidation – an argument that has been a focal point of debate amongst scholars in
the discipline. However, he claims to lean towards Aristotle’s concept of how tyranny can lead to more
tyranny, even if democracy is an objective111.
After studying the counterinsurgency movement in Latvia in the 1940s and 1950s, Juri Dreifelds states
that “one of the most important questions in the analysis of transitions is the nature of the original but
abandoned system, because new systems inevitably carry residues and baggage from their
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predecessors”112. In response to that, Sharp explains that nonviolent resistance can have positive
democratic effects, as it allows the population to explore peaceful, democratic mechanisms to stand up
against would-be dictators in the future113.
Previous research also shows that the method of transition affects the sustainability and consolidation of
democracy as a whole. Using survival analysis and propensity score matching, Bayer, Bethke, and
Lambach argue that “the transitions that were induced by nonviolent resistance campaigns are beneficial
to the survival of democracy”114 – meaning that the odds of a political regime maintaining democratic
values and processes are higher if those were brought about by nonviolent tactics. This notion is based on
how nonviolent tactics foster conditions that allow democratic survival, and make them less prone to
breakdown115.
Other factors that affect the consolidation of democracy are the establishment of democratic institutions,
the strengthening of civil society and the willingness of the population to identify the rising democratic
framework as historically legitimate116.
The mentioned authors imply that the absence of violence ensures a faster democratization process, since
nonviolence allows for the foundations of democracy to be established and may be able to ensure the
sustainability – or consolidation – of democracy.
Possible implications of using violence during mass uprisings on the voter turnout and voter
inclusiveness in democratic processes
In his book “Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions”, Ekkart Zimmermann points out that one must
“consider the relationships between political violence, voting behavior as an expression of protest
behavior, nonviolent strikes, suicide, alcoholism, and other forms of deviant behavior”117. Marx himself
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described the existence of suffrage in the British political system in 1852 as a mean of revolution itself118.
Suffrage equaled political power and strength for the majority of the stakeholders119, according to him.
However, this view may not be necessarily shared by those involved in violent uprisings that are followed
by a democratization period. Marx mainly refers to the British context at the time, where the majority of
the population consisted of proletariats, giving them the chance to achieve political and revolutionary
power through the ballot box.
In “How Nonviolent Struggle Works”, Gene Sharp states that “violent revolutions and wars have been
frequently accompanied and been followed by an increase both in the absolute power of the State and in
the relative centralization of power in its hands”120. This supports the hypothesis: when absolute power
remains with the state and power remains centralized, this rules out the active, fruitful participation of
different political actors in the system, and prolongs the democratization process – that is if the process is
not brought to a complete halt. However, the statement still remains too vague and broad to be considered
an absolute fact.
Tatiana Kostadinova, who looked at what affects voter turnout dynamics in post-Communist Europe,
states that elections after liberalizations and in emerging democracies are accompanied by unlimited, but
uncertain and unguaranteed choices121. This leaves it up to the citizen to react to the transitional
environment – a decision that is very hard to make. Factors like on-spot enthusiasm after uprisings,
election systems, number of competing parties, vote margins between parties, economic conditions and
the size of urban population were all cornerstones of Kostadinova’s study. The main conclusion of the
research could be summarized in that the “decline in mass mobilization of voters [can be] attributed to the
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transitional dynamics”122, showing a trend of drop in voter turnout after the first free election. However,
violence was not considered one of the pillars of transitional dynamics.
Perhaps the answer lies in looking at why people vote in the first place. What moves them – vengeance,
conviction, necessity of change, duty or other dynamics? Additionally, this section will look at why
people do not vote in retrospect, to determine whether violence plays a role in the equation.
When talking about rational choice theory, scholars came up with a few reasons that could push a citizen
to vote, including the sense of duty123, risk aversion124, a will to consolidate and maintain democracy125,
and the behavior of politicians and leaders126. These emerged from the notion that voting in itself is an
irrational choice, given that the value of a citizen’s vote falls below the cost of time, energy and effort it
bears, as supported by Downs’ equation of R = (B)(P) – C + D127, also known as the paradox of voting.
Here, R stands for the citizen’s reward from voting, B represents the benefit that citizen will gain when his
candidate wins, P is the citizen’s perception of whether his vote will make a difference or not
(probability), C stands for the resources used by the citizen in order to vote (cost), and D represents the
psychic satisfaction that the citizen will get after he casts his vote. The higher R is, the more likely the
citizen is going to vote.
André Blais and Robert Young conducted an experiment in 1993 during the Canadian federal election
campaign, exposing students to a presentation about the paradox of voting and the rationale behind voting
based on a cost-benefit basis. The students’ voter turnout decreased by 7% after the presentation, as their
sense of duty declined128.
In psychology, it is argued that an “individual citizen’s turnout behavior is a joint function of his or her
social location, his or her psychological dispositions, the procedures involved in voting and events that
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occur at the time of each election,”129 according to Harder and Krosnick. As opposed to Downs, the
scholars equate the likelihood of voting to (Motivation to vote x Ability to vote)/Difficulty of voting130.
While Downs focused on the internal factors that affect voting behavior, Harder and Krosnick looked at
how the external circumstances and pressures influence the citizen who is eligible to vote. While both –
internal and external – dynamics are what make up a human being in the first place, none of them can be
ignored or deemed less important.
In completion to Downs and Harder and Krosnick, Wang argues that rationality and emotion both affect
the decision to vote, but that “rationality plays a more important and consistent role in individual turnout
decision than emotion”131. It is evident throughout the study that Wang mainly relies on Downs’ costbenefit theory, which heavily relies on how the outcome of the election will affect the citizen at hand.
But where does violence fall into these approaches? Both Downs and Harder and Krosnick only consider
violence to be a relevant factor when it is taking place at the time of the voting process. So those who feel
threatened or unsafe during the time they’re supposed to head to the ballot box are less likely to leave the
house and fulfill their so-called national, democratic duty. Supposedly, established democracies should
not fall victim to such conditions, as on-election-day-violence is more likely to take place in dictatorships,
authoritarian and hybrid regimes.
However, even established democracies are witnessing a noticeable decline in voter turnout and interest
in the recent years. Before and during the 2000 presidential elections in the United States of America, the
Harvard Kennedy School launched a project entitled ‘The Vanishing Voter’, surveying almost 10,000
respondents on a weekly basis on their voting intentions. The study found that “the period from 1960 to
2000 marks the longest ebb in voter turnout in the nation’s history”132. Voter turnout stood at 63% of
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Americans in the presidential elections in 1960, while in 2000, the percentage dropped to 51% - a decline
mainly attributed to media coverage, electoral reforms, partisan politics and candidate strategy133.
As for Europe, voter turnout differs from one country to the next. By studying democratic elections in 35
European states between 1944 and 2009, Pascal Delwit found four main trends in voter participation134;
firstly, a bell-shaped trend, with the maximum turnout occurring in the 1970s and 1980s135; secondly, a
linear downward dynamic136; thirdly a stable voter turnout137; and lastly repeated, scissor-like
fluctuations138. Delwit attributes these trends in different states to “civic culture, changes in the political
system, the size of the country, the essence of electoral systems, their possible transformations and, more
generally, the terms of the institutional constraint”139. In the study’s conclusion, the scholar confirms the
existence of a general decline in voter turnout – for 45 years, Europe’s average voter turnout ranged
between 80% and 84%; however, in the 2000s, this average dropped to 69.1%140.
So why do people refrain or abstain from voting? Most studies on the relationship between violence and
voter turnout examine how criminal – rather than political – violence during elections affects the number
of voters, instead of the effect of previously witnessed violence during uprisings. For instance, Trelles and
Carreras reached the conclusion – by looking at Mexico – that those who are exposed to high level of
criminal violence in their everyday life during the election period are bound to refrain from voting141.
Powell supports this argument by stating that “high levels of voting turnout are quite strongly associated
with lower levels of deaths by violence.”142
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In her paper on violence and its effect on political behavior, Sandra Gutiérrez argues that criminal
violence impacts a citizen’s decision to politically participate, the form of participation itself, and the vote
choice143. Her study and statistical evidence about Mexico from 2006-2012 proves that “violent criminal
activity depresses electoral turnout”144. Her findings are complemented by those of Paul Collier and Pedro
Vincente who examined the presidential elections in Nigeria in 2007. Those were accompanied by
violence, not necessarily by the incumbents, but by separate factions. According to the study, “violence
systematically reduced voter turnout”145. However, it was not only a reduced voter turnout that those who
practiced violence aimed for. The study concludes that “voter intimidation works by lowering the turnout
for other candidates, thereby increasing the share of the violent candidate”146. Hence, the main aim of
pursuing the path of violence to control elections is not to merely reduce the voter turnout, but rather to
decrease the chances of opposing parties to win. Subsequently, the inclusiveness of the elections is
hampered, stepping against one of the main principles of democracy, namely providing an opportunity to
all voices of the society to take part and shape the political future of a country.
This argument is further discussed by Miguel Garcia-Sanchez, who not only looks at the effect of
violence on voter participation, but also at vote choice. Regarding voter participation, the scholar
concluded that areas or municipalities that were hit hard by violent contexts, voter participation as a
whole decreased. Voters had decided to protect themselves from political violence by deciding not to
vote, and potential candidates from the opposition abstained from running in the elections due to the lack
of safety and mobilization efforts147. This reduced inclusiveness, as well as competition in the first place.
The scholar argues that “individuals living under a violent context tend to adjust their political behaviors
in line with the strategic objectives and ideological orientations proclaimed by the armed actor
dominating the area”148. Looking at Colombia in 2005, Garcia-Sanchez states that the impact of violence
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was directly linked to the balance of military power in different areas and provinces of the country. In
places where right-wing paramilitaries had gained control and power, practicing violence prior to and
during the election process, voters were more likely to cast their ballot in favor of a right-wing candidate,
in order to protect themselves, and sometimes due to the lack of other electoral options.
However, when delving deeper into the literature, the practice of violence prior to elections does not only
aim to reduce voter turnout or change vote choices. It could also be used – on a local level – to scare away
and displace certain ethnic sub-groups, like in Kenya in 2008149. The objective of such a strategy is to
ensure a “more favorable electorate in a given locality”150 by simply and effectively evicting the citizens
who could oppose those exerting violence at the ballots. This also makes it almost impossible for
elections to be inclusive and truly representative of the society or the country’s population.
Garcia-Sanchez also explains that those who abstained from voting in a violent context were in a way
“resistant to the influence of a political context that is at odds with their political views”151, showing that
they had refused to be part of a system that had come about by violence. Powell expands this argument by
explaining that “not only does the influence of coercion on decisionmaking weaken the importance of
democratic resources, but the failure of government to maintain order and security leads citizens to look
more positively on authoritarian alternatives.”152
Although it may seem thus far that violence is mainly used by those in power against their citizens in
order to control the ballot boxes, several countries over the past and current century have witnessed
opposition groups initiating and carrying out violent actions in order to delegitimize those in power. One
of the most prominent examples of such acts occurred in the 1930s in the Weimar Republic in Germany.
Violence and intimidation were strategic tactics used by the Nazis in order to make it seem like the backthen government could not maintain order, to intimidate other opposing parties and movements like the
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Socialists, and to portray themselves as the only alternative and hope to the current system and as the only
option that may reinstate harmony153. This helped the Nazis gain power in the following polls and do
away with democracy altogether – as per the will of the people. People voted in reaction to their fear of
the violence which the current government could not contain, leading those who supported the regime in
power to either change their vote choice or abstain altogether.
Either way, whether violence was practiced by those in power or by the opposition, the legitimacy of the
regime and the system as a whole suffers when surrounded by a violent context154. Some scholars define
political legitimacy as the result of how a citizen is satisfied with the performance of the country’s
political institutions in several areas155. If the population suffers from violence in its day-to-day life, it
will surely not be satisfied with how the state is handling the situation. Miguel Carreras looked at Latin
America to evaluate how violence affects a person’s state support, concluding that a citizen’s support for
political institutions decreases when he/she faces violence. The scholar explains that this notion rests on
three main reasons: firstly, citizens become “disenchanted” by the system since it cannot ensure public
security. Secondly, those who become victims of the said violence or perceive it stronger than others lose
faith in the judicial system, since it does not seem to hold those responsible for the violence accountable
for their actions, let alone punishes them. Thirdly, violence ruins trust on an interpersonal level, leading to
a drop in state support156. When these factors come together and legitimacy is undermined, people refrain
from voting.
The emergence of violence during elections defies the very foundation of a democratic system – namely,
it obstructs the concept of free choice. “When authoritarian rulers resort to systematic violence against
opposition candidates, civil society, and independent media outlets […] they may or may not succeed, but
clearly they have stepped beyond the bounds of democratic politics,”157 as Andreas Schedler puts it in his
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paper on the “Menu of Manipulation”. This tampers with the quality of democracy, political liberty and
equality158.
Conceptual Framework and relation between the variables of the hypothesis
Before setting up a conceptual framework on how the variables of the hypothesis are linked or connected,
it is necessary to clarify on which theories the following chapters and case studies are based. This thesis
firmly stems from the argument that “the very process of transition from authoritarian rule, independently
of the conditions that generated it, helps determine not only the prospects of democratic consolidation but
also the success of the transition to democracy in the first place,”159 as Munck and Leff stated.
It also uses what Sharp calls a pragmatic approach to nonviolent action160, out of belief in the strategic
value of nonviolence in a conflict as opposed to violence, based on statistics of previous uprisings. This
is supported by Chenoweth and Stephan’s study on nonviolent resistance, which concluded that
nonviolent resistance campaigns were twice as successful as violent uprisings in achieving their goals and
emerging with democratic institutions161. However, this thesis does not simply assume that nonviolent
uprisings will automatically lead to democratic and peaceful regimes, since history has refuted this notion
several times162.
This thesis also relies on Schock’s idea that nonviolent action should not be equated to inaction,
submissiveness, avoidance of conflict or passive resistance163, and Sharp’s argument that nonviolent
behavior must emerge from within the revolutionary force, rather than be imposed on it by external
factors or entities164.
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One of the pillars of reasoning of this thesis stems from Freud’s argument regarding the displacement of
aggression, which stipulates that aggression is a consequence of frustration, just as frustration breeds
aggression, causing a vicious cycle165. In addition to that, nonviolent tactics foster conditions that allow
democratic survival, and make them less prone to breakdown166, as Bayer, Bethke and Lambach
explained.
So in summary and considering the literature and case-studies examined above, the reasons of why the
occurrence of violence adds to the prolongation of the democratization process, a lower voter turnout, and
a less inclusive election outcome can be summarized in the following:
1. One overarching concept that would suffer under violence is the legitimacy of the democratic
regime. Once the legitimacy of the system is considered questionable or even worse annulled, the
structure of democracy in itself implodes or collapses. This could occur via multiple theories.
Firstly, violence may not allow for democratic survival or consolidation since those affected by
the violence during the transition may not view the emerging democratic system as legitimate
since it is not holding those responsible for violent acts accountable. Hence, those affected by the
violence may refuse to take part in the regime’s mechanisms, through voting for instance.
Secondly, “democracies are legitimate only to the extent that they protect individual freedoms
and handle perpetrators through the legal system,”167 as Håvard Hegre states. If authorities
respond to threats too forcefully, this might undermine the legitimacy of the democratically
elected administration and cause more upheaval, which would make it harder for democracy to be
fully implemented and could stop potential voters from taking part in the elections that are
supposed to establish the democratic system. Thirdly, once citizens feel that violence has become
a frequent phenomenon in their country, they will start losing faith in the state and its security
mechanisms, and consequently stop believing that it should be in power. Furthermore, once
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citizens lose confidence in the legitimacy of the democratic system, they will start to commit
themselves less and less to the rule of law, as seen in the continuation of violence in Romania
specifically. In this process, democracy loses its appeal168, as a recent poll about the Romanian
population’s attitude towards democracy showed that almost half of the population is nostalgic to
the Communist rule.
2. The most important factor in the effect of violence on the prolongation of the democratization
process is connected to the behavior and characteristics of individuals in societies involved in
violent transitions. Carl Cohen examined the psychological traits – namely habits and attitudes of
members of a community – needed as dispositions for sustainable democracy to work. If these
traits are not in place, institutions and structures cannot be efficiently put in place for democracy
to happen or be implemented correctly, including constitutional rights, educational institutions
and informational media169. The traits Cohen finds necessary for democracy to work are humans
being conscious of their fallibility, experimentally minded, critical towards their leaders, flexible
towards changes in their lives, realistic in order to be conscious of imperfection, compromising,
tolerant, objective in order to deal with the facts, and confident about their capability of
governing themselves170. Of course, it is impossible to find communities where all citizens follow
these habits and virtues; hence, the author stresses that these characteristics need to be present in
a good amount of people for a good time for democracy to work. If these findings are connected
to the conclusion of studies dealing with the effects of political violence on the behavior and
attitude of humans, it is noticeable that violence prevents the emergence of the characteristics
needed for democracy to work. One of these studies is James Garbarino and Kathleen Kostelny’s
study on the effects of political violence on Palestinian children’s behavior, which stipulates that
the more political violence and family negativity increased, the more the children included in the
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study were at risk of undergoing behavioral risks171. Gvirsman et al. found in their research on the
effect of exposure to political violence on ideological beliefs that “adults and children who are
exposed to higher levels of political violence in person show elevated feelings of threat, hostility
toward the enemy, ethnocentrism, and support for war”172. These characteristics oppose the ones
specified by Cohen – tolerance and ethnocentrism, realism and the notion of constant threat,
compromise and hostility towards the enemy are all traits that do not go hand-in-hand. Hence,
changing the mentality that was affected by violence and fear takes time. Despite popular belief
that a habit or a trait can be changed or adjusted in 21 days, research suggests that it can take up
to 254 days173, needless to say with variation from one person to another, in order to change
behavior. While this might not seem like a very long time that would affect the duration of the
democratization process, it is necessary to understand that the change in character we are
examining is not just a habit of drinking more water or exercising – as studied in Lally et al.’s
research – but rather the shift a societal mentality as a whole. Hence, in order for democracy to
work, time needs to be taken to allow that shift to happen, and all resources and institutions in the
society need to be geared towards supporting and accelerating this change. Looking further, the
longer it takes to establish and root the democratic system in a country after a violent era, the
more likely it is to inspire further violence174, which consequently prolongs the establishment and
consolidation even further.
3. Violence can tamper with the structure of society as so-called “baggage” and residue remains
among the different societal segments and movements, leaving room for frustration and an
unwillingness to cooperate or unite. While research in this field mainly focuses on the
psychological impact of political violence on the victims and their families in terms of social
adjustment, mental health and financial situation, non-governmental rights organizations like
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Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are flooded with stories of victims of political
violence and their families awaiting that justice be implemented and those who had done them
harm be held accountable. In these instances, justice and revenge are concepts that are often used
interchangeably. Roberto Posada and Cecilia Wainryb interviewed 96 Columbian children and
adolescents about their moral judgements after their families had in one way or another been
victims of political violence. They found that “contexts underscoring revenge might give rise to
cycles of violence”175. Hence, the frustration that comes with the lack of implementing justice and
possible lack of accountability or so-called “revenge” could contribute to the lack of confidence
of those who had been affected by previous violence in the democratic system and consequently,
they would not be willing to be part of the emerging political system.
4. As stated in the previous sections, violence breeds violence. Paul Staniland states that the junction
between violence and voting are the main challenge to what he calls “meaningful
democratization”176. He adds: “Whether in the Philippines, Pakistan, or Russia, electoral
competition is intertwined with violence: pro-state militias target the supporters of opposition
parties; states use security forces to repress dissidents and intimidate the electorate; political
parties build armed wings; insurgents attack voters and candidates; and local elites use elections
as a front for pursuing feuds and rivalries.”177. This does not necessarily support the theory of
voters disbelieving in the legitimacy of or losing confidence in the democratic, electoral system
as a whole, but it does explain what would cause low voter turnout or a lack of inclusiveness of
the voter base after a violent era, such as in Romania and Bulgaria. It would also explain a less
diverse and fragmented outcome of the election, as those supporting the opposition or the entities
that had stood against the regime against which the uprising took place, would be intimated,
threatened or even harassed, leading them to stay at home instead of risking their wellbeing by
casting a ballot – again, as proven by the cases of Romania and Bulgaria. Once violence enters
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the process of transition, “violence may have a negative impact by polarizing the electorate along
conflict lines and in extreme cases lead to new outbursts of violence”178. The consequences on the
electoral process, as laid out by Staniland, need to be considered and deemed viable in places
where anti-authoritarian mass uprisings were accompanied by violence. Additionally, electoral
violence “can influence both attempts at conflict management and the consolidation of
democracy”179, according to Höglund’s study.
In summary, once violence becomes a part of a mass uprising toppling an authoritarian regime, its effect
on the behavior of the population and therefore, the establishment of democratic institutions should not be
underestimated. This thesis showed that Bulgaria and Romania explicitly are taking longer to democratize
and had more or less one-sided parliaments right after their violent uprisings in 1989. On the other hand,
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia (now Czech Republic and Slovakia) clearly overtook Bulgaria and
Romania in terms of duration of the democratization process and the internal inclusiveness of their
parliaments after their nonviolent uprisings in the same year. The repercussions of the presence or lack of
violence during the mass uprisings on the behavior of the population in each country post-uprising is
visible until this very day – with Romania and Bulgaria still struggling from subtle, but deep-rooted
internal conflicts and discomfort with the concept of democracy, and Hungary, Poland, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia’s significant progress in the democratization process and gradual increase of
substantially embracing democratic values.
The following chapter will examine the two main case studies of this thesis – Poland and Romania – and
evaluate how the variables of the hypothesis are affected by violence or the lack of it in each country.

178
179

(Höglund 2009)
Ibid.

42

Chapter III: Qualitative research – Case studies explaining the relationship between
violence, election inclusiveness and duration of democratization (Poland vs
Romania)
Poland
“The Soviet Union itself disintegrated in the face of predominantly nonviolent secessionist movements
from the Baltic states to Central Asia,”180 according to Schock. The scholar uses Poland to demonstrate
how nonviolent action was specifically successful in bringing down the communist bloc in Eastern
Europe in 1989 and the few following years. Civil resistance against the post-World War II communist
rule by the Soviet Union in Poland had started in the 1970s, causing a shift of mentality amongst the
Polish population and Soviet party leadership, as well as aiding a peaceful transition181. The Central
Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party had monopolized the country’s political sphere, not
allowing pluralism to emerge. The Baltic ports had organized strikes in 1970 and 1971 in response to
subsidy cuts that were implemented due to economic problems, discomforting the party and causing the
replacement of some officials. The next milestone in Poland was set in 1980, when demonstrations spread
in the country and the Solidarity movement came to life, leading the party to allow the formation of
independent, noncommunist labor unions and free protest, before desperately imposing the martial law in
1981. Solidarity included 9.5 million182 members in 1981, accounting to over 25%183 184 of the Polish
population back in the day.
It is worth noting that the civil resistance and discontent arose mainly due to economic circumstances
such as price surges and rising national debt, rather than political conditions. The implementation of a
communist bureaucratic system added fuel to the fire, giving way to corruption and veniality185. However,
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Solidarity noticed that in order to implement economic amendments and programs, it had to aim for
political reforms first. The Soviet Union decided to partly intervene in Solidarity’s rise in Poland, by
supporting the Polish United Workers’ Party through the deployment of Soviet troops along the Polish
border and announcing that the matter was the concern of all socialist states186. The martial law
implemented in 1981 remained intact for seven years, during which a pro-Solidarity priest was killed – a
move that ruined the chances of reconciliation the party had attempted a few years earlier with the release
of political prisoners. Although the martial law had placed chains on Solidarity, it continued to mobilize.
Strikes started intensifying in 1988, calling for the relegalization of Solidarity and the extension of
political reform. The confidence in the party had been damaged, causing it to accept negotiation offers
with Solidarity on pluralism within trade unions.
In 1989, the party allowed pluralism for the upcoming parliamentary elections, in which Solidarity beat
the communist party. Six months later, member of Solidarity Tadeusz Mazowiecki was elected as prime
minister by the National Assembly, making Poland the only communist country with a non-communist
government. Mazowiecki then put forward proposals calling for the formation of a new coalition
government, dominated by Solidarity187. The Soviet Union had accepted the changes to the political
system without firing a bullet. The pacted transition occurred with no casualties and the Polish People’s
Republic turned into the Polish Republic.
As of 2015, Poland is still considered a flawed democracy, due to drops in civil liberties and political
culture188. The country achieved an average voter turnout of 57.4%189 190 in presidential elections and a
turnout of 49.5%191 192 in parliamentary elections. Voter turnout did not significantly increase over the
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years after the anti-authoritarian mass uprising, and were remarkably lower than before the 1989 fall of
the communist regime.
In a 1987 referendum in Poland, which actually aimed to assess the stance of the population towards an
economic reform program, voters were asked: “Are you in favor of the Polish model of the profound
democratization of political life, the aim of which is to strengthen self-government, widen the rights of
citizens and increase citizens’ participation in governing the country?”193 The results showed that 69% of
those who voted, equivalent to 46% of all eligible voters, were in favor of the statement194. In comparison,
the second wave of the World Values Survey in 1997 revealed results that were more favorable of
democracy. When asked which party the respondents would vote for if there were a general election
tomorrow, 63.3%195 stated that they would vote for parties calling for a democratic system196. Hence, the
Polish population’s support of democracy increased remarkably after the uprising of 1989.
Romania
As opposed to Poland, Romania had gone through its fair share of violence by trying to break free from
the communist bloc in the second half of the last century, and had lagged in its democratization. The fall
of the communist regime in Romania was one of the most violent of all anti-communist mass uprisings
against the Soviet bloc197, and had been deemed the one with least revolutionary outcome198. Naming the
events that occurred in Romania in 1989 has been a tricky affair. Labelled as an elite coup199 by some
scholars, it was also considered a coup with a popular uprising200 by others, and deemed a revolution201 by
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a few. Some even considered it “a blend of spontaneous revolt from below, conspiracy, and coup
d’état”202.
After the Berlin Wall collapsed in November 1989, and Czechoslovakia brought about the Velvet
Revolution, Romania started reacting to the communist rule over its country, partly encouraged by how
the Soviet Union seemed not to interfere with the danger facing communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
Following the examples of their neighbors, Romanian citizens took the streets of Timisoara in December,
and brought about civil disobedience in protest against the dictatorial-personalist regime of Nicolae
Ceaușescu. The president had ruled with repression enforced by the secret police, and his reign was
considered a “personalized, sultanistic, neo-patrimonial, totalitarian neo-Stalinist regime”203. In March
1989, some members of the regime accused Ceaușescu of “discrediting socialism, ruining the economy,
and earning international condemnation over human rights issues”204, and the living standard in Romania
had become one of the lowest in Eastern Europe205. The event that triggered the protests was the state’s
attempted eviction of pastor László Tőkés, who had been calling for reform. In addition to that, Romania
had been suffering from economic deprivation, suppression of wage demands, and a seven-day work
week206. A crackdown by the security apparatus on the protestors killed tens and injured hundreds, but did
not stop the revolt. Ceaușescu left on a state-visit to Iran, during which the military retreated and the
demonstrators took over the city. A few days later upon his return, he started slandering the protestors in
the media, and justified the physical coercion used against them by labeling it a “legitimate defense of the
people’s socialist achievements”207, which definitely did not add to his popularity. He organized a rally in
his own support, gathered by his security apparatus, but was in shock as the crowd all of a sudden chanted
against him, and could not even be calmed or influenced by the president’s promise of a rise in minimum
wage. Over the following weeks, tension heightened and marches spread, as protesters took over the
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television building. Violent repression was used against the demonstrators without avail. Ceaușescu fled
the country on the 22nd of December, and the Romanian television announced the abolishment of the
communist regime, and the creation of the National Salvation Front led by Ion Iliescu. Iliescu was a
former party ideologue who had refused Ceaușescu’s atrocious measures in the past, and promised the
people a complete shift to democracy. Ceaușescu and his wife were executed by a firing squad on
Christmas day – a move that was considered the eradication of hope for a counter-revolution and
retributory justice208.
The exact number of casualties that occurred during Romania’s anti-authoritarian mass uprising of 1989
is disputed, ranging from 1,000 and 1,200, while initial claims were estimated at 60,000209. However, it
did not stop there. Although the communist regime had been ousted and the National Salvation Front
promised democracy, Romania would not completely settle and recover. The Front turned into a party and
resurrected some of the communist regime’s public figures amid massive opposition. Elections took place
in May 1990, in which Iliescu won with 85%210, and the National Salvation Front obtained the majority in
both houses of the Assembly211, with 66% in the parliamentary elections212. They had been accused of
hijacking the anti-authoritarian mass uprising, but Iliescu heavily depended on intimidation and progovernment miners213 in order to silence the opposing voices and restore order214.
Iliescu kept opposing suggested democratic reforms by other parties and had made sure his party
remained in power, even on a bureaucratic level215. He was not replaced until the elections of 1996.
Political violence had caused the loss of many lives, and had contributed to the emergence of violence in
the years to come. According to John Gledhill and others, “throughout the 1990s, Romania's transition
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from authoritarianism was witness to repeated instances of intense collective violence”216. However, it
was not only political violence that had plagued Romania. Ethnic violence against the Roma and the
Hungarian minority in Romania had been spreading over the years, and in March 1990, several people
died in clashes in Tirgu Mures – a town predominantly inhibited by Hungarians217. It was not until
Romania joined the European Union in 2007 that documents and eye witness accounts about the violent
transition period became available for scholars to study. That was when Gledhill updated his studies on
what had been happening in Romania and its consequences, singling out the violence that took place
during the country’s transition from communism as the key element that delayed the establishment and
consolidation of democracy218.
Until 2015, Romania was still considered a flawed democracy219, although its constitution “provides for a
presidential-parliamentary system that, while endowing the presidency with substantial authority, also
assigns the Parliament real power to monitor executive behavior”220. The presidential elections over the
years had an average voter turnout of about 62%221 222, and parliamentary elections also stood at 62%223
224
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“Years of Ceaușescu-inspired distrust, suspicion, fear, and social atomization – by now [1990] deeply
ingrained in people’s habits – stand in the way of developing tolerance for other opinions, which is
essential to a functioning democracy,”225 according to Verdery and Klingman. The scholars here do not
only refer to political opinions, but to conflicts regarding nationality and religion as well. The lack of
tolerance brought about by repression and continuous violence in Ceaușescu and Iliescu’s regime
embedded a notion in the Romanian society that vividly opposes the very basic requirements for
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democratization and effective implementation of democratic tools and processes. Moreover, despite
religious freedoms being protected by law and the state, society itself stands in the way of such rights.
Additionally, the relationship between the population and the state had become complex, as many
Romanians had reached a point where they “resist anything that resembles the construction of state
power”226.
Bruce O’Neill traces the roots of the lack of tolerance and the heightened crime rate to the communist-era
practices. “From fascist prisons to Communist-era gulags227, Romania does not simply have a history of
torture, but also an existing infrastructure conducive to its practice,”228 he states in his paper “Of camps,
gulags and extraordinary renditions: Infrastructural violence in Romania”.
While public opinion polls about democracy in Romania before 1989 are hardly – if at all – attainable, a
recent poll by INSCOP Research conducted in 2014 revealed that 44.4% of respondents believed that
living conditions were better during the Communist era, compared to 33.6% who claimed the opposite229.
This number was higher compared to the poll conducted in 2010, in which 54% claimed that living
conditions were better before the anti-authoritarian mass uprising, and only 16% said they were worse230,
hinting at a possible nostalgia to Communist rule. This may imply that a considerable portion (almost
half) of the population is not very fond of the way the country is governed at this point in time – noting
that it is not democracy they yearn for, but rather Communism.
Before starting to compare both countries according to the variables of the hypothesis, it is important to
understand what might had led to the use of violence in Romania’s uprising as opposed to Poland. Here,
looking at two factors is necessary, namely the economic conditions of the country before 1989 and the
strength of civil society and labor movements.
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Economic Conditions
The economic conditions of a country can certainly affect how calls for regime change unfold. Here it is
important to highlight the difference between a rentier state and a tax state. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo
Luciani introduced the idea of the rentier state, which stipulates that governments that rely on rent-money
are less likely to take a turn towards democracy, since the local population does not really have influence
on the government policies, due to their lack of power in financial terms. The influence and power comes
from above. On the other hand, government budgets that are relying on tax-money from their citizens are
more likely to comply to the will of the people and local population, since the financial and economic
power comes from below231. Rentier states are considered more prone to political violence, according to
the literature in the discipline. The reliance of the state on external sources for revenue can lead to
violence for a variety of reasons, one of which is the likelihood of rebel groups to use violence in order to
gain natural resource wealth. Another reason would be the emergence of grievances in case rent revenue
is used by the government or those in to suppress and / or ignore the population, which could eventually
lead to violence. The third most common reason in the literature is the that the structure of rentier states is
weak and vulnerable to violent challenges, due to a corrupt elite that uses revenues for personal gains
rather than national interest or common good232.
Prior to the 1989 uprising, Romania had turned into a rentier state. Before the 1980s, investment in
Romania was directed at flagship industries, rather than consumption, leading to overproduction and
severe saturation, as well as input shortages and underused capacity233. This led the country to become
indebted to European counties, who provided Romania with the technology needed for its industrial
development on credit. Throughout the 1980s, Romania had been a state of high sovereign debt and
austerity policies. “When the price of oil and development finance went up abruptly in 1979, the low
energy efficiency of Romanian industry pushed the country into a situation where debt levels became
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unsustainable,”234 Cornel Ban wrote in his study “Sovereign Debt, Austerity, and Regime Change: The
Case of Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania”. Ceausescu decided to pay off foreign debt through taking on a
loan by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the expense of worsening conditions of the local
economy, and hence the well-being of the population, due to his conviction that debt and independent
policymaking do not go hand-in-hand. The IMF later on in 1991 described the situation as follows:
“Ceausescu’s legacy was an economy plagued by inefficient industrial structures and an almost obsolete
capital stock, a completely disorganized system of production and distribution, a collectivized agricultural
sector, a decaying infrastructure, and a population whose living standards had been forced steadily down
to a level where even basic necessities – food, heating, electricity, and medical attention – were hard to
come by. There is little doubt that the initial obstacles to reform in Romania were far worse than those
faced by other reforming East European countries.”235
Between 1976 and 1981, Romania’s foreign debt increased from $0.5 billion to $10.4 billion, and from
1980 until 1982, the country had to pay $6 billion to foreign creditors, needing 80% of its hard currency
exports to finance foreign debt236. In early 1981, the IMF approved a $1.3 billion loan which did not go
through in the end. Western banks also accused Romanian banks of the kitting of checks, leading to
further requests for loans to be denied237. Arrears accumulated, reaching $1 billion by the end of 1981.
But this was not the only consequence of the austerity measures. Living standards suffered a severe blow,
the more the debt cycle intensified. Between 1981 and 1989, the supply of food staples and the production
of consumer goods were nearly halved due to the necessity of collecting US dollar reserves.
The austerity measures that marked the 1980s in Romania severely affected the distribution of wealth and
failed to cover the basic needs of citizens238. A decrease in wages and the deprivation of consumption
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caused minor mobilization in 1987, of which demands gradually turned from restoring the socioeconomic
status pre-austerity to regime change.
Although Poland and Romania were both in debt in the years prior to the uprising, each country chose a
different path to deal with the economic difficulties. When faced with the possible adoption of austerity
measures, Poland declined, while Romania enforced the austerity measures to a severe extent.
Although Poland’s foreign debt multiplied several times between the years of 1972 and 1979 and reached
even higher levels than Romania, it chose to experiment with “alternative forms of property, economic
coordination, and economic sourcing of political legitimacy”239 instead of taking on international credit.
External debt had reached over $25 billion by the end of 1980, owed to governments and 500 foreign
commercial banks240. In 1981, the country announced that it was unable to service the debts, causing
uproar among the Western banking and financing institutions, as the country had above all not been a
member of the IMF at the time. In 1981, national income had fallen by a quarter in three years, inflation
had reached 15%, a third of income was not matched by goods in shops, a third of industrial capacity was
unutilized due to a shortage in energy, and a labor surplus plagued the country241. This was followed by a
martial law declaration in December 1981. In 1982, Poland and the creditors reached a rescheduling
agreement. A Committee for Economic Reform was established, which brought about a reform program
based on the democratization of planning and policymaking mechanisms, as well as self-reliance, selffinancing of enterprises, and self-management by workers242. Although the reform program was not fully
implemented the way it had been envisioned and despite constant struggles between the regime and the
opposition, it had saved the country from becoming a rentier state by strengthening internal positions.
All in all, Poland was not considered as much of a rentier state like Romania, as it sought alternative ways
to deal with the economic difficulties at hand, instead of throwing itself into even more debt.
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Civil Society and Labor Movements
As mentioned in the literature review, Della Porta and several other scholars believe that a strong civil
society is key to a peaceful uprising, emphasizing that weak civil societies are usually a characteristic of
“violent uprisings and troubled democratizations”243. One of the main differences between Poland and
Romania is the strength of each country’s labor movements.
Poland’s Solidarity had become the first established, independent labor union in a country under Soviet
rule. As mentioned earlier, Solidarity included 9.5 million244 members in 1981, accounting to over 25%245
246

of the Polish population back in the day. Solidarity itself came to life after the Gdańsk Agreement in

1980, which came in response to 21 demands by the Interfactory Strike Committee (known as MKS). The
demands had called for free, independent trade unions, a right to strike, improvement of economic
decisions etc247. Given difficult economic conditions in the 1960s and 1970s, and a surge in food prices in
the summer of 1980, workers at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk went on strike, and amid popular support,
the government agreed to sign the Gdańsk agreement at the end of August 1980s. The founders of
Solidarity had been actively involved in the MKS, and Solidarity went on to be a major movement in the
political scene down the line. Poland had witnessed a “long-rehearsed civic discourse”248 before the
uprising in 1989, unlike Romania.
“Because of the late emergence of a working class, Romania had little experience with grass-roots labor
movements,” Bachman wrote in 1989249. Romania had suffered a dwindling in labor reserves in the
1970s, after it had invested massive capital and labor inputs into the economy after World War II. In
addition to that, the growth of labor productivity slowed at the end of the 1970s, despite the government’s
plans to double labor productivity by 1990. Productivity took a hit due to economic centralization, the
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lack of the workers’ input on their working conditions and incomes, and the lack of rewards. “The labor
force endured low wages, few bonuses, ungenerous pensions, long workweeks, poor living conditions,
and a general sense of powerlessness,” Bachman explained250. Ceausescu attempted to spur productivity
by implementing different payment systems – a move that resulted in more apathy and demoralization of
the working force. However, the resistance to such measures rarely actively manifested in the form of
riots or mobilization, but rather passively in the form of sloppiness or lack of discipline, and the workers
felt alienated from those who were supposed to defend their interests. In the 1970s, a survey of 6,200
Romanian workers revealed that more than 63% did not feel their union was representing them251. Solid
strikes and demonstrations appeared only in the late 1980s.
The most organized labor movement in Romania was the pro-government miners, who frequently came to
Bucharest to support Iliescu’s regime and spread terror and fear in the streets of the capital in order to
silence the opposition.
In summary, regarding the strength of labor movements in Poland and Romania, the former enjoyed
strong labor unions and movements, while the latter rather suffered from a weak labor movement, which
could be explanatory for the presence or absence of violence in each case.
Violence
Poland and Romania had witnessed different levels of violence prior to the uprisings in 1989. Since even
before World War II, Romania had been suffering from violence under the Iron Guard – violence that was
mainly directed against resistance and opposition to the ruling regime. Between 1946 and 1989, around
617,000 political prisoners were detained, while 120,000 of them died in labor camps252. Poland as well
had its fair share of violence, but it is barely comparable to what was happening in Romania. The violence
in Poland was also rather directed at Jews returning from concentration camps after the war had ended,
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reaching a peak in 1946, when a pogrom killed 42 people253. One reason for the use of violence in
Romania, specifically during the uprising, was explained by Roberts, stating: “Some of the violence of the
events in Romania […] can be attributed to the fact that the Ceausescu regime, being more nationalistic
and independent of the Soviet Union than most others in Eastern Europe were at the time, could not be
restrained from using extreme violence by Moscow to anything like the same degree as the regimes in
East Germany or Czechoslovakia.”254
Duration of democratization
While Poland and Romania are considered flawed democracies, the former ranks higher in The
Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2015, as it achieved higher scores in electoral processes
and pluralism, functioning of the government and political participation. The difference in ranks is not
significant enough to be considered crucial in terms of the duration of the democratization process.
The Polity IV Project dataset, which assesses political regime characteristics and transitions from 1800
until 2006, evaluates democracies in different countries on an eleven-point scale (from 0-10) through the
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about
alternative policies and leaders, the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. Countries ranked below
6 are considered anocracies, meaning incoherent authority regimes, while those who score 6 and above
are considered fully institutionalized democracies255. The results of the examination of this specific
variable in the study show that while both Romania and Poland’s scores in terms of democratic
institutionalization are increasing over the years, Romania seems to democratize at a slower pace than
Poland256. Hence, the comparison of both cases supports the hypothesis regarding the duration of the
democratization process after mass uprisings. Romania, being the violent example, seems to be evolving
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at a slower pace than Poland, and was considered a democracy years after Poland had already
democratized.
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Figure 1: Visualization of the Polity IV Project DEMOC variable257
Voter turnout and voter inclusiveness
In terms of voter turnout, both countries have been subtly declining, with minor fluctuations (Appendix 1
and 2). However, when looking at the inclusiveness in terms of voter base in the parliamentary elections
after the 1989 Polish uprising, it is noticeable that the parliaments consisted of various factions. In his
paper “Poland’s three parliaments in the era of transition, 1989-1995”, Jerzy J. Wiatr looks at the
composition of the three parliaments that followed the uprising. He describes the post-uprising timeframe
as witnessing a “relatively long period of power-sharing”. He states that the first parliament from 19891991 was not necessarily representative, as Solidarity won 35% of the parliamentary seats258. The second
parliamentary round from 1991-1993 suffered from fragmentation, and the third from 1993-1995 lacked
the presence of right-wing parties “due to their failure to reach the required electoral threshold”259.
Although the term “fragmentation” is accompanied by the verb “paralyzed” in Wiatr’s paper, it does
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highlight inclusiveness in voter demographics in terms of political affiliation, possibly emphasizing that
voters from different political factions and ideologies participated in the elections. One may look even
further than the elections of 1993. In 2015, Poland’s conservative, opposition Law and Justice Party had
won the parliamentary elections, getting the majority of seats – this was the first time that a single party
would be able to govern Poland alone since 1989, and the first time there was no left-wing presence in the
parliament260. Hence, inclusiveness in the elections was, and still is present in Poland.
In Romania, as opposed to Poland, the parliamentary and presidential elections of May 1990 were
surrounded by several intimidation and harassment campaigns against nominees from the opposition.
These campaigns included violence, threats, harassment and assassination attempts, mainly against
presidential candidates and the headquarters of opposition parties. Reports state that between January and
early May, “133 [Peasant] party officials had been seriously injured, 388 beaten while inside party offices
located throughout the country, 189 party members attacked in their own homes and two party canvassers
killed”261. Besides the pre-election violence, campaigning was difficult for members of the opposition, as
most voters depended on the state-owned television in order to be informed about the elections and the
candidates. Iliscieu won the presidential elections by 85% and the Front witnessed a 67% victory in
Senate and Deputy elections, while reports of fraud circulated262. Despite this being the first multi-party
elections in Romania, it comes to show that voting for any other party than the Front was a difficult and
threatening task. Given the election results, it is clear that the voter base was not diversified, possibly due
to the intimidation campaigns that preceded the elections, the fragmentation of the opposition, people’s
fear of change263 and the lack of awareness amongst voters, putting the meaningfulness of the elections
into question.
Hence, when looking at the inclusiveness of the elections’ voter pool, the discrepancy between both
countries cannot be overseen. While Poland had remained peaceful throughout the uprising and its
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following elections, Romania had been plagued with violence, which had led to a diversified voter pool
and parliament in the first country and a one-party majority parliament in the second.
Country

Violence

Year of election

Inclusiveness in parliament

Poland

No

1989

Yes

Romania

Yes

1990

No

Table 1: Inclusiveness in post-1989 parliaments in Poland and Romania
However, there is another variable that highlights a main difference between Poland and Romania: the
strength of the civil society in each country. While Romania had a very weak civil society by the time the
anti-authoritarian mass uprising broke out, Poland had enjoyed a very strong civil society which was
being established for decades before it carried the anti-authoritarian mass uprising forward. Whether this
variable overrides the variable of violence is questionable, but that will not be examined in this paper.
In summary, comparing the cases of Poland and Romania lead to the following main findings:
1. Regarding the duration of the democratization process:
Poland, which had experienced a nonviolent uprising, ranks higher in the Economist’s
Democracy Index than Romania, which had witnessed a violent uprising. Additionally, Poland
progress in the democratization process was faster than Romania’s, according to the Polity IV
Project. Hence, Poland’s democratization process has been faster and more efficient than that of
Romania.
2. Regarding the voter turnout and election inclusiveness:
Poland’s parliaments after the 1989 uprising and up until 2015 were distinguished by multiplicity
and lacked an absolute majority, indicating the participation of a diversified voter pool.
Romania’s presidential and parliamentary elections, on the other hand, showed absolute majority
parliaments and absolute majority presidential victories, indicating a lack of inclusiveness.
Romania also witnessed intimidation and harassment campaigns during the elections, and a
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significant portion of its population believes that living under Communist rule was better than
today.
The following chapter will examine the Medium N cases of this thesis – Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia – and evaluate how the variables of the hypothesis are affected by violence or the
lack of it in each country.
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Chapter IV: Medium N cases – Review of cases with similar background and
evaluation of their development in terms of voter turnout and inclusiveness, and
duration of democratization (Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia)
While the previous section singled out two cases that mainly differed in the amount of violence used
during the transition period from communism to democratization, this section will look at cases that had
endured similar circumstances when talking about socioeconomic structures and communist rule, and at
how they had developed in the process of democratization, voter turnout and inclusiveness. The countries
examined in this section are Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (which later was divided into the
Czech Republic and Slovakia).
Hungary
The Hungarian People’s Republic became the Republic of Hungary in October 1989. Hungary had
previously attempted to overthrow the Soviet grip on the nation in 1956 with student protests, hoping to
step out of the Warsaw Pact; however, those dreams were crushed – along with the killing of 25,000
people264 – when Red Army tanks took over the streets of Budapest once again265. Communist power was
restored, and leaders of the 1956 revolution were executed. Mikhail Gorbachev, who was the General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union back then, had started
applying restructuring policies in the 1980s, specifically in Hungary, adding flexibility to the structure of
the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party which was led by János Kádár. In 1986, demonstrations
swept the country, mainly due to the ill-treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The party was
very much involved in talks with the opposition, giving the reformist communists in Hungary the chance
to peacefully take over the party in 1989 and oust Kádár. So-called “democratic stability”266 ensued in
Hungary over the coming months, and the communist party kept losing in the elections.
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The transition was not violent and no casualties were witnessed. In regards to the duration of the
democratization process, Hungary was still considered a flawed democracy in 2015267 at rank 54, with its
main strength being the electoral process and pluralism, and its main weakness being political
participation. The voter turnout for parliamentary elections averaged at 65%268 269 since the transition,
barely higher than that of Romania (62%), which had witnessed remarkably more violence during the fall
of its communist regime.
Bulgaria
Ever since the Communist regime took hold of Bulgaria in the 1940s, it had been accompanied by
violence mainly directed at its opposition and human rights advocates, and specifically against the
Turkish minority, which was either killed or forced to immigrate in an attempt to “bulgarize” the
country270. The anti-authoritarian mass uprising and transition itself in 1989 was not necessarily violent,
but the preceding era had proven itself to be prone to use force to kill, torture, sentence to death, imprison
or displace members of the opposition and the Turkish minority. Throughout the Communists’ grip on
Bulgaria, 1,500 people were killed at the iron curtain in the area271. The constitution had given the ruling
Communist party overruling rights and power. As then-general secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev launched his era of reforms in the Soviet Union in the 1980s,
Bulgarians started demanding more openness and democratization272. Communist leader of Bulgaria
Todor Zhikov was forced to resign in November 1989, as internal party rivalries and ongoing protests in
the streets called for the end of the Communist regime and a transition to democracy, as well as an
improvement of economic conditions. Society in itself was divided between the elderly generation
advocating for socialism. The Communist party renamed itself to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and
its opposition came in form of a coalition under the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The BSP won
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the first parliamentary elections in 1990, while the UDF succeeded in the parliamentary elections of 1991
– but they did not last long. Demonstrations escalated again in 1997, also dubbed as the “real turning
point of the anticommunist revolution”273, and resulted in the recently formed United Democratic Forces’
victory. Throughout the anti-authoritarian mass uprising and up until 1997, violence was contained.
Until 2015, Bulgaria is still considered a flawed democracy according the Democracy Index, ranking 46,
with its strength lying in electoral process and pluralism and weakness in political culture. Parliamentary
elections in Bulgaria averaged at 63.1%274 since 1991, with an exceptional high of 84% and 75% in 1991
and 1994 respectively, which quickly subsided in 1997 to about 59%. Presidential elections averaged at
54.3%275 since 1992, skyrocketing at the beginning with 75%, but quickly dropping to 50% in 1996276.
These numbers represent the enthusiastic hype in elections after the fall of the communist regime, which
was previously explained.
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia’s way out from Communist rule through the so-called Velvet Revolution and its so-called
‘divorce’ later on were very peaceful endeavors. While it started out with the police beating student
demonstrators in November 1989, the remainder of the anti-authoritarian mass uprising passed without
major violent occurrences and no deaths. Inspired by the example of East Germany, Czechoslovakians all
over the country protested against the police’s actions against the students, quickly followed by the
formation of the Civic Forum in Prague and the Public Against Violence in Bratislava277 in an attempt to
negotiate with the government. Opposition had snowballed in the last two years of Communist rule
amongst independent organizations, the intellectuals and the elite. After 21 days, the Communist
government resigned without the loss of any lives, and Václav Havel was elected president in December
1989. From 1990 until 1993, the country was completely reformed in terms of political and economic
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structure. Given ethnic issues, Czechoslovakia broke into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic –
again, without any violence278.
The Czech Republic is considered a flawed democracy, ranking 25th worldwide. Its strengths lie in the
electoral process and pluralism, as well as civil liberties. Its weakness is the political participation of its
citizens279. Parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic averaged at 71.97%280 281 since 1990. Only one
presidential election took place from 1989 until today, which had a voter turnout of 59.08%282.
Slovakia is also considered a flawed democracy at rank 43, excelling at electoral process and pluralism
and lagging behind in political culture and political participation283. Parliamentary elections in Slovakia
witnessed a voter turnout of 71.46%284 285 from 1990 until 2016, and an average turnout of 55.26% in
presidential elections from 1999 until 2014.
Despite Czechoslovakia’s peaceful transition and division, the emerging countries did not rank much
better than Romania or any other East European country that had gone through the process violently.
Duration of democratization
To compare the duration of the democratization process between the Medium-N cases, I will refer once
again to the Polity IV Project Democracy score throughout different periods of evaluation (POE).
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Figure 2: Values of DEMOC variable in Polity IV Project dataset286
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which all witnessed a peaceful uprising, went through a faster
democratization process, while Bulgaria’s pace of democratization was slower after its violent uprising in
1989.
Voter turnout and inclusiveness
Hungary’s first parliament after its 1989 uprisings consisted of mainly six major parties: the Alliance of
Free Democrats (21.3%), the Alliance of Young Democrats (8.9%), the Christian Democratic People’s
Party (6.5%), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (24.7%), the Hungarian Socialist Party (10.9%) and the
Independent Smallholders and Citizens Party (11.7%)287. It also included one seat for the agrarian alliance
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(3%)288. With no absolute majority, the election implies that the voters came from different backgrounds
and political mindsets, assuring inclusiveness in the voter pool.
In Bulgaria, the parliament of 1991 consisted of three major movements: the Union of Democratic Forces
(34.36%), the Bulgarian Socialist Party (33.14%) and the Movements for Rights and Freedoms
(7.55%)289. Although there was no party with an absolute majority, the first Bulgarian parliament after the
anti-authoritarian mass uprising was much less diverse and inclusive than those of Poland or Hungary,
consequently showing a lack of inclusiveness in the voter pool.
Czechoslovakia’s post-1989 parliament consisted of members of six movements: The Civic Forum –
Public against Violence (46.6%), the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (13.6%), the Christian
Democratic Union / Christian Democratic Movement (12%), the Movement for Self-Governing
Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia (5.4%), the Slovak National Party (3.5%) and Coexistence
(2.8%)290. Without no absolute majority and more parties voted into the Chamber of the People than in
Bulgaria and Romania, the peaceful transition in Czechoslovakia was followed by a parliamentary
election that included voters from various political ideologies.
Country

Violence

Year of election

Inclusiveness in parliament

Hungary

No

1990

Yes

Bulgaria

Yes

1991

No

Czechoslovakia

No

1990

Yes

Table 2: Inclusiveness in post-1989 parliaments in Eastern Europe
The following chapter will lay out the main points of comparison and findings that emerged while
examining and deep diving into the case studies.
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Chapter V: Comparison and Findings
In order to compare all cases in this study, the table below summarizes all statistics known so far.
Duration of
Inclusiveness of
democratization
Country

Violence

Supports
elections in post-1989

(compared to

hypothesis
uprising

other countries)
Poland

No

Faster

Yes

Yes

Romania

Yes

Slower

No

Yes

Hungary

No

Faster

Yes

Yes

Bulgaria

Yes

Slower

No

Yes

Czechoslovakia

No

Faster

Yes

Yes

Table 3: Overview of variable statistics concerning the case-studies
The variables discussed in this thesis are violence, duration of democratization, voter turnout, and
inclusiveness of elections. As Table 3 shows, all cases support the hypothesis that the more violence
occurs during a mass uprising, the slower the democratization process and the lower the inclusiveness of
the elections. For this, the thesis examined five Eastern European, post-war countries that had been
similar in geography, social constructs, political systems, and history, but different in terms of the amount
of violence they faced during the uprisings against Communism in 1989. In order to look into each
variable in a more detailed manner, the following subsections discuss the findings and data used for each
dependent variable.
1. Duration of the democratization process:
Since all of the countries are still considered flawed democracies, the duration of democratization for all
of them is still ongoing. In that manner the hypothesis could not be fully supported or refuted depending
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only on this index, as it considers the conclusion of the democratization period once the country is
considered a full democracy. However, looking at the countries rank in the Democracy Index shows that
the countries which had endured a violent uprising rank lower than the others.
Country

Rank in 2006

Category in 2006

Rank in 2015

Category in 2015

Czech Republic

18

Full Democracy

25

Flawed Democracy

Slovakia

41

Flawed Democracy

43

Flawed Democracy

Hungary

38

Flawed Democracy

54

Flawed Democracy

Poland

46

Flawed Democracy

48

Flawed Democracy

Bulgaria

49

Flawed Democracy

46

Flawed Democracy

Romania

50

Flawed Democracy

59

Flawed Democracy

Table 4: Overview of democracy statistics in 2006 and 2015 concerning the case-studies
On the other hand, when relying on the Polity IV Project dataset, the duration and pace of
democratization in each case shows that Hungary was the fastest to democratize, followed by Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania respectively. Given that Bulgaria and Romania are the
two cases that witnessed violent mass uprisings, this supports the hypothesis. Figure 3 below clearly
demonstrates how the democratization process has been slower in Bulgaria and Romania than the other
examined countries.

67

Non-violent

Violent

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Figure 3: Values of DEMOC variable in Polity IV Project dataset291
2. Inclusiveness in elections:
Based on the outcome of the parliamentary elections of each of the cases examined after the 1989
uprisings, it has become evident that the parliaments of countries that did not undergo violence during
their rebellion against the Communist regime were more diverse and included members of more parties
than the others. In the case of Romania, it was evident that violent campaigns of harassment and
intimidation were executed in continuation of the violence that took place during the uprising. The
violence also fed the lack of autonomy among the Romanian population and the minorities in the country,
causing tension, and allegedly led to an absolute majority in parliament. Although Romania had nine
movements in its 1990 parliament, the absolute majority achieved by the National Salvation Front shows
291
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that the majority of those who believed in the process and went to vote had a certain political affiliation or
ideology, while the others were harassed and threatened, and while members of the opposition also faced
similar fates. Table 5 compares between the five countries examined in this thesis in terms of
inclusiveness of elections.
Absolute

Number of

majority

movements

achieved

represented

Year of
Country

Violence

Inclusiveness

election

in parliament

Poland

No

1989

No

7

Yes

Romania

Yes

1990

Yes

9

No

Hungary

No

1990

No

6

Yes

Bulgaria

Yes

1991

No

3

No

Czechoslovakia

No

1990

No

6

Yes

Table 5: Inclusiveness in parliamentary elections
3. Other findings:
Going through the statistics, there are several findings and conclusions that can be reached that are not
necessarily connected to the hypothesis. These include:
1.

Although the Czech Republic had a nonviolent anti-authoritarian mass uprising and transition, it
moved from being a full democracy in 2005 to a flawed democracy in 2016, showing that even
though it seems like it had taken a shorter time to democratize, the democratization itself was not
very sustainable and consolidated. Additionally, its rank in the Polity IV Project dropped in 2006
from 10 to 9.

2. All the examined cases dropped in their democracy rank between 2005 and 2015, showing that
even those who had been close to fully democratize had failed to do so, especially Hungary.

69

3. The amount of violence that occurs during a mass uprising does not necessarily affect the voter
turnout as a whole. According to the cases looked at here, voter turnout in parliamentary elections
in Poland, which is considered an extremely nonviolent example, falls way below Romania and
Bulgaria. Additionally, the voter turnout in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are also
not that high compared to countries that had gone through violent anti-authoritarian mass
uprisings. When looking at the voter turnout of the presidential elections, Romania actually
scores highest among all cases.

Country

Voter Turnout Parliamentary

Voter Turnout Presidential

Elections

Elections

Violence

Poland

No

49.5%

57.4%

Romania

Yes

62%

62%

Hungary

No

65%

NA

Bulgaria

Yes

63.1%

54.3%

71.97%

59.08%

71.46%

55.26%

Czech Republic
No
Slovakia

Table 6: Voter turnout in parliamentary and presidential elections
4. It is noticeable that the voter turnout in presidential elections in most cases is significantly lower
than in parliamentary elections.
5. When taking a deeper look at the exact rankings of the case studies in the Economist Democracy
Index 2015, the following becomes noticeable292:
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Electoral

Functioning

Overall
Rank

Process and

of

Pluralism

Government

Score

Political

Political

Civil

Participation

Culture

Liberties

Czech
25

7.94

9.58

7.14

6.67

6.88

9.41

Slovakia

43

7.29

9.58

7.5

5.56

5

8.82

Bulgaria

46

7.14

9.17

6.07

7.22

5

8.24

Poland

48

7.09

9.58

5.71

6.67

4.38

7.35

Hungary

54

6.84

9.17

6.07

4.44

6.88

7.65

Romania

59

6.68

9.17

5.71

5

5

8.53

Republic

Table 7: Overview of democracy statistics concerning the case-studies293


Romania and Bulgaria both rank low in Electoral Process and Pluralism and Functioning of
Government, compared to the nonviolent cases.



Romania ranks low in Political Participation, supporting the hypothesis.



Bulgaria ranks high in Political Participation, refuting the hypothesis.



Romania and Bulgaria rank average in Political Culture and Civil Liberties.

All in all, the examined cases support the hypothesis. This shows that the amount of violence during mass
uprisings does affect the democratization process and the inclusiveness of elections during and after the
transition period.
The following chapter will bring the findings to a conclusion and look at recommendations for future
research, as well as limitations of this thesis.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
Nonviolence should not be glorified by scholars, as Gay Seidman294 and Kurt Schock295 stated, but how
right were they? The cases examined in this thesis prove that the duration of the democratization process
and the inclusiveness of elections are affected by the violence that took place during the countries’
transition periods. But Seidman and Schock do have a point – scholars have been bound to propagate
nonviolence, making it seem like the general trend of the discipline of nonviolent uprisings and
democratization relies on the principled nonviolence approach. It seems like the majority of scholars
focused on advocating nonviolence, rather than examine it. While Chenoweth and Stephan would not
agree to that statement given their pragmatic nonviolence approach, it is safe to say that in their study, the
scholars looked at the success of the toppling of regimes, not necessarily the democratization and
consolidation process. Here it is important to define “success”.
While this thesis would definitely fall under the umbrella of propagating nonviolent tools of political
behavior, not everything that shines is actually gold. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index
2015 report states that “Eastern Europe does not have a single ‘full democracy’, as some of the region’s
most politically developed nations, such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, have
suffered bouts of political instability and popular support for democracy is surprisingly low”296.
One cannot deny that the examined cases that had more peaceful transitions ranked higher in terms of
quality of democracy than those who had been subject to violence. However, almost all cases in this study
had a main point of weakness in their democracies, namely the political participation of its citizens,
according to the Democracy Index 2015. Hence, although it seems like an instant glorification of
nonviolent uprisings is in order, one should not overestimate the effectiveness of nonviolent mass
uprisings that aim to move from authoritarian to democratic regimes.
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Although Europe is considered a continent in which most democratic nations are located, it seems that
complete democratization has not been attainable to many of them. Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary each have their own setbacks which they had experienced over and over
again ever since the fall of the Communist bloc in 1989.
I would like to conclude this thesis by two quotes of political analyst Noam Chomsky. The first is: “Nonviolent resistance activities cannot succeed against an enemy that is able freely to use violence. […] You
can't have non-violent resistance against the Nazis in a concentration camp.”297
The second is: “Mass non-violent protest is predicated on the humanity of the oppressor. Quite often it
doesn't work. Sometimes it does, in unexpected ways. But judgements about that would have to be based
on intimate knowledge of the society and its various strands.”298
These quotes indicate the need to culturally, economically and societally understand and differentiate
between countries in order to correctly assess whether nonviolent anti-authoritarian mass uprisings would
be able to efficiently oust authoritarian regimes. This means that the efficiency of nonviolent mass
uprising and political participation tools cannot be generalized across the globe.
Limitations
One major limitation of this thesis is the lack of reliable data about the quality and duration of democracy
before 1989, in relation to the case studies. This is mainly due to the Communist restrictions of public
opinion polls and surveys, as well as assessments of the political systems and voter behavior in countries
of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe after World War II until the mass uprisings of 1989. Hence, it
was difficult to dig up data and statistics that correctly and effectively portrayed the situation prior to the
transitions brought about by the uprisings. This specifically refers to the case of Romania, in which the
state’s security apparatus rigorously censored and – for the lack of a better expression – kept the lid on
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(Chomsky and Barsamian 1992)
(Becker 2008)
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research by civil society organizations and other entities that did not comply to the official, political
institutions in place at the time.
Another limitation is the lack of violent mass uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1989. Romania and Bulgaria
were the only countries that effectively witnessed violence before and during 1989. Consequently, the
case studies were limited to the two mentioned countries and three examples of nonviolent uprisings,
namely Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The amount of the latter was limited in order to ensure a
balanced comparison and analysis.
Recommendations
For future research, it would be beneficial to expand on the number of cases and conduct regional case
studies, with focus on anti-authoritarian mass uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa and Latin
America. Although this thesis projects that a correlation may exist between the amount of violence and
the duration of democratization and the inclusiveness of elections, it would add if future researchers
looked at it from a more qualitative perspective and establish indices that measure the manifestation of
violence’s psychological impact in political behavior as a whole.
Additionally, while the Economist’s Democracy Index is the easiest to obtain, its methodology and
definitions do not necessarily coincide with how most researchers would label “full” or “flawed”
democracies. Its reliance on public opinion surveys and official, governmental statistics on voter turnout
comes to seem most logic, but not most accurate. History has over and over again proven how
governments can manipulate statistics regarding political behavior, not just voter turnout. Additionally,
relying on public opinion surveys in countries when available seems to make sense; however, referring to
public opinion surveys of similar countries when the surveys for the country are not available seems a
very far stretch. Unfortunately, the index is as close to reality as any other available source or ranking on
democracy and its quality.
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In the end, it is important to not glorify nonviolence with a sense of advocacy when conducting researches
about the matter. While it is understandable that people tend to believe that the world would be a better
place if violence diminished, the core of our science is to examine what happens in reality, not what
happens in our imagination of a better world.
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Appendices
Appendix 1:
Voter turnout in Poland (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Year

Voter Turnout

Type of Election

1989

62.11%

Parliamentary

1990

53.40%

Presidential

1991

43.20%

Parliamentary

1993

52.08%

Parliamentary

1995

68.23%

Presidential

1997

47.93%

Parliamentary

2000

61.12%

Presidential

2001

46.18%

Parliamentary

2005

50.99%

Presidential

2005

40.57%

Parliamentary

2007

53.88%

Parliamentary

2010

55.31%

Presidential

2011

48.92%

Parliamentary

2015

55.34%

Presidential

2015

50.92%

Parliamentary
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Appendix 2:
Voter turnout in Romania (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Year

Voter Turnout

Type of Election

1990

79.69%

Parliamentary

1992

76.29%

Parliamentary

1996

75.90%

Presidential

1996

76.01%

Parliamentary

2000

56.62%

Presidential

2000

65.31%

Parliamentary

2004

55.21%

Presidential

2004

58.51%

Parliamentary

2008

39.20%

Parliamentary

2009

58.02%

Presidential

2012

41.76%

Parliamentary

2014

64.11%

Presidential
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Appendix 3:
Rankings and scores of Poland and Romania in the Democracy Index 2015, published by The Economist
Intelligence Unit.

Rank

Overall
Score

Electoral
Process and
Pluralism

Functioning
of
Government

Political
Participation

Political
Culture

Civil
Liberties

Poland

48

7.09

9.58

5.71

6.67

4.38

7.35

Romania

59

6.68

9.17

5.71

5.00

5.00

8.53

91

Appendix 4:
Rankings and scores of Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria in the Democracy Index 2015,
published by The Economist Intelligence Unit.

Rank

Overall
Score

Electoral
Process and
Pluralism

Functioning
of
Government

Political
Participation

Political
Culture

Civil
Liberties

Czech
Republic

25

7.94

9.58

7.14

6.67

6.88

9.41

Slovakia

43

7.29

9.58

7.50

5.56

5.00

8.82

Bulgaria

46

7.14

9.17

6.07

7.22

5.00

8.24

Hungary

54

6.84

9.17

6.07

4.44

6.88

7.65

92

Appendix 5:
Voter turnout in Hungary (parliamentary elections), as published by the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Year

Voter Turnout

1990

65.10%

1994

68.92%

1998

57.01%

2002

70.52%

2006

67.57%

2010

64.38%

2014

61.84%
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Appendix 6:
Voter turnout in Bulgaria (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Year

Voter Turnout

Type of Election

1991

83.87%

Parliamentary

1992

75.17%

Presidential

1994

75.23%

Parliamentary

1996

49.79%

Presidential

1997

58.87%

Parliamentary

2001

66.63%

Parliamentary

2001

54.92%

Presidential

2005

55.76%

Parliamentary

2006

42.62%

Presidential

2009

60.64%

Parliamentary

2011

48.25%

Presidential

2013

52.49%

Parliamentary

2014

51.05%

Parliamentary
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Appendix 7:
Voter turnout in the Czech Republic (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Year

Voter Turnout

Type of Election

1990

96.33%

Parliamentary

1992

84.68%

Parliamentary

1996

76.29%

Parliamentary

1998

74%

Parliamentary

2002

57.95%

Parliamentary

2006

64.47%

Parliamentary

2010

62.6%

Parliamentary

2013

59.48%

Parliamentary

2013

59.08%

Presidential
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Appendix 8:
Voter turnout in the Czech Republic (presidential and parliamentary elections), as published by the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Year

Voter Turnout

Type of Election

1990

96.33%

Parliamentary

1992

84.68%

Parliamentary

1994

75.41%

Parliamentary

1998

84.25%

Parliamentary

1999

75.42%

Presidential

2002

70.07%

Parliamentary

2004

43.48%

Presidential

2006

54.67%

Parliamentary

2009

51.67%

Presidential

2010

58.84%

Parliamentary

2012

59.11%

Parliamentary

2014

50.48%

Presidential

2016

59.82%

Parliamentary
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Appendix 9:
Detailed table of the DEMOC variable for case studies (Poland and Romania):

Year
1987-1988
1988-1989
1989-1990
1990-1991
1991-1992
1992-1993
1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003
2003-2004
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007

Poland

0

Romania

0

5

8

5

9
8

10
9
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Appendix 10:
Detailed table of the DEMOC variable for Medium N cases (Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Slovakia):

Year

Hungary

1987-1988

0

1988-1989
1989-1990

2
0

Czech
Republic

Slovakia

Bulgaria

0

0

0

8

8

1990-1991
1991-1992
1992-1993
1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000

7

10
10

2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003
2003-2004
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007

8

9
9

9

10
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Appendix 11:
Average of scores of violent and nonviolent cases in this thesis in the DEMOC variable:

Year

Non-violent cases

1987-1988
1988-1989
1989-1990
1990-1991
1991-1992
1992-1993
1993-1994
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003
2003-2004
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007

0
0.5
1.25
7.75

Violent cases

0

8.5
6.5
8.75

9
8
9.5

8.5
9.75
9
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